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The necessity of good corporate governance is not a new issue and goes back to the 
well known work of Berle and Means (1932). Already in the 1930s the authors 
discussed arising difficulties associated with the separation of ownership and control 
and warned against the concentration of economic power in the hands of managers of 
large companies at the simultaneous absence of appropriate and efficient control 
mechanisms. 
 
In the successive years scientists engaged in the field of business management and 
enhanced the theories of Berle and Means. Due to major economic crisis, the topic of 
corporate governance gained even more importance in the recent years and has 
therefore become the subject of multitudinous theoretical papers and empirical studies. 
The takeover wave of the 1980s in the United States (US), scandals like Enron and 
WorldCom, the bursting of the dot.com bubble, corporate collapses, and management 
failures are some examples that have shown the need for tighter legislation and 
effective monitoring instruments. Additionally, the growing number of large and 
international operating companies, global competition, and the rising importance of 
private and institutional investors as capital source require sound corporate 
governance. Therefore, reliability, accountability, and transparency of a company and 
its management are relevant factors when searching for external sources of finance. 
 
Good corporate governance structures have to take corporate and economy-specific 
circumstances into account such as the degree of separation of ownership and control, 
ownership identity, internal and external monitoring mechanisms, the market for 
corporate control, product market competition, and the legal corporate environment. 
The identification of such basic characteristics and tendencies allows to suggest certain 
practices in order to establish better cooperation by reducing discrimination and the 
misuse of control. Since the proper functioning of corporate governance is fundamental 
for good performance, growth, and economic stability it can be seen as an important 
basic requirement for economic welfare and upswing. 
 
Even in market economies there are substantial challenges on corporate governance 
which increase tremendously in transition economies. Countries with socialistic 
background had to establish first of all competition and basic market structures in order 
to develop market economies of industrialized countries. Long lasting systems of state 
control had left their mark on companies and business operations. Political, social, and 
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economic reforms were undertaken in order to enforce broad restructurings of these 
prevalent systems. Corporate governance had to be revolutionized and new 
mechanisms had to be defined including fundamental changes in legislation and in 
corporate behavior. These challenges shall be illustrated on the chase of Poland that 
left planned economy behind and developed to a market-oriented system during its 
transition process of the 1990s. Thereby specific focus lies on the creation and 
execution of corporate governance mechanisms, related strengths and weaknesses, 
and their impact on company performance and economy. 
 
Since the creation of an extensive legal corporate framework does not simultaneously 
imply the enforcement of regulations and a widespread commitment to governance 
standards there is an ample field of further considerations. Unfortunately, many Central 
and Eastern European countries show weak enforceability of existing laws which 
crucially undermines the effectiveness of existing regulations. The enforcement, 
monitoring, and sanction of transparency and disclosure guidelines substantially varies 
among countries and shall be closely examined in the case of Poland. Therefore, the 
website presentation and compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements in 
annual reports will be analyzed in order to get a general idea of the real effectiveness 
and efficiency of governance standards in Poland. 
 
Recapitulatory, this diploma thesis attempts to give an overview on essential corporate 
governance issues and provides specific considerations on this topic with respect to 
the current governance standards in Poland. Finally, the actual quantity and quality of 
the compliance with disclosure standards is examined in detail. Therefore, the diploma 
thesis is structured as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 provides a general introduction in basic principles of corporate governance 
and shortly discusses the separation of ownership and control. Chapter 3 characterizes 
common corporate governance mechanisms such as the management and supervisory 
board, the market for corporate control, and ownership structures. Additionally, this 
section identifies important issues and practices of corporate governance. Chapter 4 
dwells on two prevalent systems of corporate governance, the outsider system as 
common in Anglo-Saxon countries and the insider system prevalent in Continental 
Europe and Japan. 
Chapter 5 refers to transition economies and fundamental challenges of reform 
processes. Chapter 6 focuses on specific tasks and methods used in Poland’s 
transition from planned to market economy. Chapter 7 provides an overview of the 
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corporate governance system in Poland and examines strengths and weaknesses of 
the current framework. Chapter 8 critically examines disclosure standards in Poland by 
discussing research results of various authors. Chapter 9 provides case studies on four 
Polish listed companies with respect to their website disclosure and their compliance 
with mandatory disclosure regulations. Chapter 10 concludes. 
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2. Basics Principles 
In literature many different definitions of corporate governance can be found. This 
section provides a selection of diverse approaches of well-known authors and 
recommendations of institutions. Additionally, a short look at historical and theoretical 
backgrounds of the separation of ownership and control will be presented. 
2.1. Definitions of Corporate Governance 
Zingales (1997) connects the issue of corporate governance explicitly with the theory of 
the firm. According to the authors view, the term governance is comparable with the 
exercise of authority, direction and control. The allocation of control affects the division 
of economic and contractual surplus which especially matters in a world of uncertainty 
and incomplete contracts. Therefore, Zingales explains corporate governance as: 
“[..] a complex set of constraints that shape the ex post bargaining over the 
quasi-rents generated by a firm.”1 
Quasi-rents are defined as the difference between what two parties actually generate 
together and what they could obtain in the market. The incomplete character of the 
initial contract between the principal and the agent shows the need for differentiation 
between decisions made ex-ante, when the parties enter into the relationship and 
those made ex-post, when quasi-rents are divided. Hence, corporate governance has 
to motivate investments that are not rewarded in the market.  
Zingales restates the question of who should control the company in whose 
investments need to be protected more in the ex-post bargaining process. According to 
his remarks shareholders need most of the protection by appropriate control 
mechanisms because their investments are totally exposed to general business risks 
and other relationships, for example the relationships between the company and its 
suppliers, are better contractually protected than those to shareholders. 
 
The perspective of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) examines the agency theory and the 
classic challenges connected with the separation of ownership and control. The 
authors address the issue that: 
 
                                                
1 Zingales, 1997, p.4 
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“Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.” 2 
 
Furthermore, Shleifer and Vishny state: 
“Much of the subject of corporate governance deals with the constraints 
that managers put on themselves, or that investors put on managers, to 
reduce the ex post misallocation an thus to induce investors to provide 
more funds ex ante.”3  
Because of unforeseen future events, the nature of incomplete contracts implies that 
most of the residual control rights stay at the managers’ side and empower them to 
allocate investors’ funds. Managers can expropriate funds, use transfer pricing 
methods to enrich themselves, or secure their own jobs even if they are no longer 
qualified to run the company.4 
One method to align manager’s interests with those of investors is to design incentive 
contracts that grant the manager different types of compensation. Additionally, 
investors have to exercise their control and information rights provided by law. But 
often the free-rider problem, generally faced by individual small investors, keeps them 
from actively participating in the monitoring of the management or bars them from 
information about current actions of the company. Large institutional investors and 
large creditors, such as banks, take their monitoring and participation possibilities more 
seriously than small individual investors, and influence management’s decisions in the 
degree of their legal rights. Thus, legal protection of both minority and majority 
investors and the active participation of concentrated ownership parties are essential 
and complementary elements in good corporate governance. 
 
Monks and Minow (1995) define corporate governance as: 
“[..] the relationship among various participants in determining the direction 
and performance of corporations.”5 
Coincident with many other authors, Monks and Minow state that although 
shareholders are seen as the owners of a corporation their actual influence and control 
is relatively small in contrast to that of managers. Shareholders are so diverse and 
                                                
2 Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p.737 
3 Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p.743 
4 See Shleifer and Vishny, 1989 
5 Monks and Minow, 1995, p.1 
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widespread that it is difficult to see their relationships to the company in the sense of a 
traditional ownership of former times. The different interests of managers who run the 
business and shareholders who provide capital and own the company lead to the 
principal-agent theory. Besides the general framework of shareholder protection, 
Monks and Minow especially point out the monitoring role of the board of directors as 
the link between investors and managers. 
 
Additionally, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
published several recommendations on the topic of corporate governance, to be found 
in its OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. OECD defines corporate governance 
as follows: 
“Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a 
company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through 
which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining 
those objectives and monitoring performance are determined. Good 
corporate governance should provide proper incentives for the board and 
management to pursue objectives that are in the interest of the company 
and its shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring. The 
presence of an effective corporate governance system, within an individual 
company and across an economy as a whole, helps to provide a degree of 
confidence that is necessary for the proper functioning of a market 
economy.”6 
The OECD principles7 are intended as global benchmark to provide specific guidance 
in legislative and regulatory questions to both OECD and non-OECD countries. In 1999 
the OECD put out their first statement to important corporate governance issues and 
revised it in 2004. Therein, the OECD identifies six basic fields of organizational 
concerns: 
1. An effective corporate governance framework should aim to provide transparent 
and efficient markets in consistency with dominant legislation. 
2. The position of the shareholders should be protected through sufficient access to 
information, through appropriate participation and consulting possibilities, and 
through sufficient legal protection of their rights. 
                                                
6 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2004, p.11 
7 See OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2004 
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3. All shareholders, including minority, institutional, and foreign shareholders, should 
be treated alike. 
4. The role of the stakeholders and their rights should be established by law or mutual 
agreements to enhance the cooperation between corporations and stakeholders to 
generate good sustainable relationships. 
5. Disclosure and transparency of the financial situation, the performance, the 
ownership, and the governance of a corporation are basic requirements of good 
corporate governance. 
6. The board has the responsibility for an effective monitoring of the management. 
Additionally, the accountability of the board to the company and its shareholders is 
seen as an essential issue. 
 
Recapitulatory, one can say that the need for corporate governance arises from the 
separation of ownership and control and therewith connected agency problems. 
Altogether, minority shareholders, institutional investors, creditors, the board of 
directors, the market, and last but not least, the state through its enforced legislation 
have to contribute essentially to a well-functioning governance system. 
2.2. Separation of Ownership and Control 
For a better understanding of circumstances and theory behind corporate governance, 
this section provides a short discussion of basic backgrounds. 
2.2.1. Historical Background 
Primary corporations in the seventeenth century were of very simple nature. The 
traditional corporation was relatively small and owned by only one or a few persons or 
by a family. Owners themselves or confidents of the owners ran the company, made 
day-to-day decisions concerning operational issues, capital investments, and usage of 
earnings. Conflicts with stakeholders, as employees, suppliers, or recipients, were as 
well existent but not at all comparable to nowadays appearing problems and 
dimensions. Generally it was in all parties’ interest that the corporation performed 
smoothly and gained adequate returns. 
 
Berle and Means (1932) are one of the first authors who discussed the upcoming 
reversal of the trend of corporate ownership at the end of the nineteenth century. 
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Emerging new corporate structures of large, mass-producing, manager-controlled 
companies brought unknown challenges for both company owners and legislation. 
Industrialized big companies needed large amounts of external capital to finance 
corporate investments. The number of shareholders increased steadily, power relations 
were bilateral and the classical entrepreneurial function was divided between 
executives and anonymous small equity investors, creating responsibility and 
monitoring problems. In the following fifty years both theoretical approaches and 
practical corporate law were affected by Berle’s and Means’ recommendations. In the 
1980s major criticism on the work of Berle and Means became clamant because of a 
general collapse of trust in regulatory solutions of economic problems and of several 
economic enhancements. Capital markets eliminated excess capacity through 
leveraged acquisitions and buyouts, hostile takeovers, and divisional sales. However, 
apart from a few necessary adjustments Berle’s and Means’ work is still valid 
nowadays.8 
 
The business environment of the twenty-first century is characterized by internationally 
expanding areas of business operations, the wave of technological and organizational 
innovations, the great need for capital investors, dispersed ownership, and empowered 
managers. If public legislation and monitoring through shareholders, boards of 
directors, and the market doesn’t work effectively, the factual control over corporations 
will exclusively be in the hands of managers, opening great possibilities of abuse. 
2.2.2. Theoretical Background 
The agency theory provides a theoretical explanation of the problems arising from the 
separation of ownership and control. Jensen (2000) defines the agency relationship as: 
“[..] a contract in which one or more persons – the principal(s) – engage 
another person – the agent – to take actions on behalf of the principal(s) 
that involve the delegation of some decision-making authority to the 
agent.”9 
Following Jensen’s remarks, the principal needs the agent to perform a special task 
which the principal cannot execute by himself. The agent provides special skills and 
qualifications for this task and receives a reward for his undertaken actions. Although 
all conditions of this relationship are specified in a contract concluded between the 
                                                
8 See Bratton, 2000 
9 Jensen, 2000, p.137 
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principal and the agent uncertainty and information asymmetry lead to major difficulties 
between the principal and the agent. Uncertainty means unforeseen future events that 
may influence the outcome of business operations and cannot be specified ex-ante in 
the contractual agreement. Asymmetric information is on the disadvantage of the 
principal who is naturally worse informed than the directly involved business agent. 
Asymmetric information can be subdivided into hidden information, seen as information 
or qualification possessed by the agent but not by the principal, and hidden action, 
interpreted as information differences caused by certain actions of the agent that 
cannot be monitored by the principal. 
Additionally, each party tries to maximize its own utility which implies that the agent will 
not always act in the interest of the principal. The principal can limit these opportunistic 
divergences by giving the agent appropriate incentives and by monitoring and limiting 
the deviating actions of the agent. The dollar equivalent of the reduction in welfare 
experienced by the principal as a result of the differences in utility maximization, the so-
called residual loss, is also part of the agency costs. Moreover, it is costly for the agent 
to expend resources to guarantee not to take certain actions that harm the principal. 
These costs are called bonding costs and generally, both the principal and the agent 
face positive monetary or non-monetary bonding costs. According to this, agency costs 
are: 
“[..] the sum of 1. the costs of creating and structuring contracts between 
the principal and the agent, 2. the monitoring expenditures by the principal, 
3. the bonding expenditures by the agent, and 4. the residual loss.”10 
 
There is no denying that the relationship between shareholders and managers perfectly 
fits the above presented definition of agency relationships. Managers (agents) need 
funds from shareholders (principals) to finance their business ventures, while 
shareholders need the skills and the specific know-how of managers to generate 
returns on their investments. Contractual agreements between shareholders and 
managers configure the usage of invested capital and the division of the gained 
surplus. Due to unforeseeable future events, these contracts tend to be incomplete and 
provide potential source of agency problems. Incomplete contracts and the special 
know-how of managers serve them with residual rights of control and give them an 
enormous range for self-interested behavior. Managers may undertake inefficient 
actions, as the expropriation of funds or transfer-pricing, which are extremely costly 
                                                
10 Jensen, 2000, p.86 
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from investors’ perspective. Managers may also assure their own jobs, although they 
aren’t qualified and capable anymore.11 
Lest managers violate the contract between the company and the shareholders, 
shareholders have to monitor them and actively exercise their legal rights. 
Shareholders have inter alia the right to access business-specific information, to vote 
on important corporate-matters, and to elect the board of directors as internal 
monitoring entity. In this context often the so called free-rider problem arises which is 
characterized through the absence of shareholder activism. Mostly small shareholders 
may find it too costly or too exhausting to stay informed about corporate operations and 
to participate in voting procedures, and therefore blindly rely on the management itself 
or on the action of other shareholders. They devalue their own legal rights, give away 
the possibility to codetermine, and issue managers free tickets to do ‘whatever they 
want’. 
Renegotiation of inefficiency producing facts ex-post is very difficult and will not provide 
a protection against new inefficiencies. A better solution may be to align the interests of 
managers with the interests of shareholders ex-ante by granting them long term 
incentives. Such an optimal incentive contract is determined by manger’s risk aversion, 
the degree of his decision-making and the liquidity of cash flows.12 The close 
relationship between pay and performance helps to ensure that managers act on 
behalf of the shareholders and go for a stable and well-performing company. However, 
one problem of such contracts is that managers may abuse them and manipulate for 
example accounting numbers to increase their remuneration. 
 
Additionally, agency costs are not only observed between shareholders and managers, 
but also between shareholders and creditors, and managers and creditors. Each party 
has different preferences on how the company’s resources should be used. 
Shareholders like to maximize the value of equity, prefer riskier investment policies 
than those that would maximize the total value of the company, and neglect the value 
of debt. In contrary, creditors play safe to get full repayment of their loans and 
undertake less risky investment policies than those that would maximize the company’s 
value. Managers prefer policies that benefit their compensation and facilitate their 
managerial life. These differing preferences can result in non-value maximizing 
behaviors, since information asymmetries between shareholders, managers and 
creditors complicate ex-ante contractual agreements and ex-post monitoring.13 
                                                
11 See Shleifer and Vishny, 1989 
12 See Stiglitz, 1975; and Holmstrom 1979 and 1982 
13 See Prowse, 1994 
 10 
3. Mechanisms of Corporate Governance 
Business environment involves multiple cross-linked parties and factors that contribute 
to corporate governance and benefit or suffer from each others actions. Corporate-
internal as well as corporate-external forces shape the distribution of power and 
control. Several main mechanisms of corporate governance are the identity and degree 
of ownership concentration, the corporate-internal and corporate-external functions of 
disciplining management, and the institutional structures behind monitoring authorities 
and the board of directors. These factors will be discussed in the following. 
3.1. Ownership Structure 
The ownership structure of a company can be examined in terms of various identities 
of investors and in terms of high or low concentration of shareholdings. 
3.1.1. Ownership Identity 
The provided classification of ownership identities in this section mainly refers to Müller 
(2003). 
 
Minority shareholders are common in many economies all over the world. 
Characteristically for dispersed ownership are both a very large number of 
shareholders and a very small amount of shares held by each of them. Although 
investors buy shares identifying themselves with the company or benefiting from other 
ideological values, a rational acting shareholder only provides capital to a company in 
return of obtaining a claim on the profits of this company. Returning to agency 
problems, on the one hand, shareholders want to see management maximizing the 
value of the company and consequently the value of their shares, but on the other 
hand, with highly dispersed ownership, no single shareholder can directly control 
management. The exercise of voting rights and undertaken monitoring actions are 
likely to be insignificant. Sufficient monitoring requires the investment of resources in 
order to collect information and to be well informed about corporate operations. Even if 
minority shareholders were willing to sacrifice these resources, they would fail in 
influencing management’s decisions due to their minority stake. Though minority 
shareholders could connect forming alliances with other investors to efficiently exercise 
their control rights over management, this is hardly observed in practice. 
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Institutional shareholders, as mutual funds or pension funds, typically hold larger 
stakes in multiple companies to maximize the value of their portfolios. Further, 
institutional shareholders tend to minimize the short-term risk of their investments. If 
company performance falls short of their expectations they can either participate 
actively in disciplining management or sell their shares. Actively participating, large 
shareholders can cover the agency problem in having both the interest in profit 
maximization and sufficient control over the assets of the company. 
The free-rider problem may also occur among institutional investors as they reluctantly 
take on private costs for a public benefit. With increasing ownership stakes the free-
rider problem decreases and investors become more active especially if costs can be 
shared.14 Although active institutional investors are important to a well-functioning 
governance system, large shareholders can also turn to a major problem, if their 
interests differ from the interests of other stakeholders. This may reduce efficiency 
through adverse effects on the incentives of managers and employees who might 
reduce their firm-specific human capital investments.15 Large shareholders tend to 
frequently act at the expense of minority shareholders, creditors, the management, and 
the employees by pursuing their own interest.  
 
Banks can be substantial creditors of a company and/or holders of large ownership 
stakes of the same company. Holding large stakes a bank can directly exercise control 
on management through voting rights. Additionally, banks often hold seats on the 
board of directors and exert monitoring and control, as particularly common in Japan 
and Germany. 
Commercial banks naturally pursue to maximize their profits. As creditors they want to 
receive complete repayment of granted loans and thus want the company to take 
projects with lower risk than those that might maximize the combined value of the 
company’s debt and equity. As shareholders they expect optimal amounts in dividends 
and want to take higher risk than would be optimal for the company. This leads to a 
principle conflict of the goals of bank managers who exercise control over commercial 
companies and is not always consistent with the goal of maximizing the market value of 
these companies. 
 
Managerial ownership stakes arise from two differing reasons. Either, the manager of 
the company simultaneously is the single owner and incorporator of that company or a 
family group splits ownership among themselves. Or, managers of public traded 
                                                
14 See Charkham, 2005 
15 See Shleifer and Vishny, 1997 
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companies hold shares on the company they manage, due to granted stock options as 
part of pay-performance incentive contracts. In the presence of agency problems, tying 
executive compensation to performance links manager’s welfare to shareholders’ 
wealth and acts as internal governance mechanism. Although managerial stock 
ownership can motivate managers to care more about the interests of the shareholders 
and increases their sense of responsibility for the company, it can also create adverse 
effects on company’s performance. Managers might expropriate their gained control, 
since an increase in control fosters the protection from disciplinary effects or takeovers. 
 
The state can also act as large shareholder in a couple of cases. Typically, state-
owned or government-controlled companies are founded to protect consumers from 
being exploited by a company in a natural monopoly situation. Such natural monopolies 
involve utility companies, railroads or postal services. Companies as airports, 
petroleum companies, or armament factories may belong to state-ownership in cases 
where national pride or national security require this way of control. Generally, state-
owned companies are assigned to some ministry which monitors their operations and 
sets corporate objectives. Additionally, state-owned companies are sometimes used to 
polish a country’s budget or its government policies by utilizing their revenues for other 
purposes. As profit maximization is not among major goals of state ownership, 
governments have few incentives to ensure that the enterprises they own are well run 
and nationalized companies sometimes even operate in deficit. 
Privatization became extremely popular in recent years and in times of increasing 
competition. It exposes these companies to market competition and the management 
has to substantially reorganize the company in order to establish a profitable and well 
performing organization. 
3.1.2. Ownership Concentration 
One can mainly distinguish between dispersed and concentrated ownership. As stated 
by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) one big disadvantage of dispersed ownership is the 
greater incentive of shirking by single owners leading to poorer performance of the 
company. The costs of poor performance are shared among all owners and therefore 
one single owner only bears a small proportion of these costs. In contrary, with 
concentrated ownership a correspondingly higher proportion of benefits and costs 




Demsetz and Lehn (1985) examine several determinants that influence the structure of 
corporate ownership: the value-maximizing size of a company, the control potential 
faced by shareholders, and the existence of regulation. 
The value-maximizing size of a company acts as major determinant of the ownership 
structure. With an increase of the viable size of a company both company’s capital 
resources and the market value of ownership stakes increase. Higher costs of 
obtaining a given fraction of ownership promote widely dispersed ownership. Moreover, 
risk aversion and utility-maximizing behavior prevent shareholders from concentrating 
ownership in large companies where the cost of capital is high. Therefore, an inverse 
relationship between the size of a company and the concentration of ownership can be 
observed. The greater the value-maximizing size of the company the higher will be the 
degree of dispersed ownership. 
The second factor influencing the concentration of ownership is the control potential, 
defined as the wealth gain of shareholders through effective monitoring of managerial 
performance. The control potential is linked to company-specific uncertainty and to the 
instability of company’s environment. Operating in an unstable environment forces 
managers to make unexpected and complex decisions and shareholders find it more 
difficult and costly to monitor managerial behavior. Therefore, increasing economic 
uncertainty requires tighter control over management through a higher amount of 
ownership concentration. 
Regulation of company issues acts as the third determinant of ownership structure. 
Systematic regulation reduces the control potential by restricting the freedom and 
options available to shareholders. Additionally, regulatory mechanism control and 
monitor companies and discipline management. Regulated companies are likely to 
have a lower concentration of ownership than unregulated companies. 
3.2. Managerial Compensation 
Through the separation of ownership and control, managers are executing value-
fostering activities whereas shareholders are the residual claimants of these activities. 
The efforts of managers are often difficult to observe and direct control is too complex 
to ensure that mangers are acting in the interest of the shareholders. One way of 
dealing with these principal-agent problems is to set special incentive contracts for 
managers maintaining a close relationship between pay and performance. Tying 
executive compensation to performance, links managers’ welfare to shareholders’ 
wealth and acts as internal governance mechanism. Such an optimal incentive contract 
is determined by the manger’s risk aversion, the degree of his decision-making, and 
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the liquidity of cash flows.16 Furthermore, managers should only be rewarded for the 
outcomes over which they have direct control. 
 
There are many mechanisms through which compensation policy can provide value-
increasing incentives, including an annual performance-based bonus, stock options, 
long-term incentive plans (restricted stock plans, multi-year accounting-based 
performance plans, pension plans), and performance-based dismissal decisions. The 
fixation of performance objectives to benchmark companies isolates specific industry or 
economy related factors as for example an overall up or downturn in economy. To 
ensure that the manager is not overexposed to risk, a certain percentage of base 
salary is generally included in total compensation. The total compensation plan 
composes of a selection of individually weighted single instruments. 
 
Performance-based bonus systems are aimed for the fulfillment of given standards and 
goals. A standard based on the economic value added (EVA) is advantageous over 
accounting-based measures because the cost of capital is taken into account, and 
advantageous over market-based measures, because EVA is more controllable by 
managers.17 EVA is the difference between the net operating profit after taxes and the 
weighted average cost of capital including the costs of invested equity. One 
disadvantage of EVA is that it acts as flow measure, does not take future cash flows 
into account, and could create adverse incentives for managers who have a decision 
horizon shorter than the life of the projects that are considered. Typically, a mixture of 
EVA-, accounting- and market-based measures is used to set the standard for the 
bonus system. 
The most common payout schedule is the 80/120-type bonus plan. This means that no 
bonus is paid when performance falls below 80 percent of the standard, and that bonus 
is capped once performance exceeds 120 percent of the standard. The system works 
well if performance is somewhere in the middle of the 80/120 interval but is crucial at 
both its cap and its floor. On the one hand, if the year-to-date performance suggests 
that annual performance will exceed the required standard to achieve the bonus cap, 
managers will withhold effort and attempt to inventory earnings for use in the 
subsequent year. And on the other hand, if it becomes obvious that performance will 
fall below 80 percent managers will have no incentives to work hard, they even have 
incentives to reduce performance and bring forward expenditures to lower the budget 
standard of the successive year. 
                                                
16 See Stiglitz, 1975, and Holmstrom, 1979 and 1982 
17 See Koch and Nenning, 2004 
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This difficulty can be avoided by establishing a bonus bank system whereas one-year’s 
full bonus is not paid out immediately and a negative performance below the floor is 
memorized. This system implies that one part of the bonus is paid out to the manager 
immediately and that the other part is booked to a personal bonus bank. In case of a 
negative bonus, the bonus bank is charged with a corresponding negative entry. 
Consecutively, a pre-determined percentage of the accumulated deposit on the 
personal bonus bank is paid out to the manager each year. In this way, both 
performances above the cap and below the floor are regarded and the bonus system 
becomes more long-term oriented. 
 
Stock options have become extremely popular in the past ten years, as the attraction of 
this remuneration instrument is its high sensitivity to stock price developments. 
Typically, those options can only be exercised after a certain duration and grant the 
owner to buy a pre-specified amount of shares at a pre-specified exercise price. If the 
stock price trades above the exercise price at expiration managers gain value in 
exercising the option, vice versa the option becomes worthless and option incentives 
powerless. 
Koch and Nenning (2004) state that stock option programs are often divided into 
tranches, where managers receive one option package per year. These options are 
typically emitted ‘at the money’ which means that the exercise price of the option 
equals the current stock price. If so, management benefits from high stock price 
volatility because even if stock price does not increase in the long run every now and 
then tranches are emitted when the stock price is low. Another possibility is the 
emission of stock options for which the exercise price increases over duration. In this 
case the option only stays valuable when real value is created and return requirements 
of shareholders are exceeded. However, option programs may also cause adverse 
incentives since executives tend to manage short-term earnings at the expense of 
long-term value creation in order to boost the stock price. 
 
Furthermore, levels of remuneration vary substantially among countries. Managerial 
compensation in the US heads the ranking, followed by the United Kingdom (UK), while 
Central-European countries are located far behind. US Chief Executive Officers 
(CEOs) earn 125 percent more than their UK counterparts and additionally the 
differences in the composition of pay levels are remarkable. UK CEOs receive a base 
salary of 31 percent, an annual bonus of 30 percent and long-term incentives or stock 
options of 39 percent of the total direct compensation. In contrast, US CEOs are 
remunerated much more through long-term performance-dependent parts and base 
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salary amounts to only 10 percent, the annual bonus to 10 percent, and long-term 
incentives to 80 percent of the total direct compensation.18 
 
Although incentive-compensation contracts have become very popular, there is no 
direct evidence that higher pay-performance sensitivities lead to higher stock market 
performance. Anyway, executive compensation should never be the only mechanism to 
ensure good corporate governance but rather be one instrument among various. 
3.3. The Board of Directors 
Boards play an important role in corporate governance since they are the internal 
control mechanism of the company and have the ultimate responsibility for the effective 
functioning of the business. The board of directors can hire, fire, and set the 
compensation of the CEO, supervise management’s actions, and give advice to 
important strategic and economic questions or veto poor decisions. 
The structure of boards and their relationships to the management varies among 
countries, primarily due to legislative differences. Two main styles are the one-tier and 
two-tier board system. One-tier boards combine the competence of management and 
control and consist of both inside directors who are concerned with business 
operations and outside directors who are responsible for the monitoring of the 
company. This structuring leads to more flexibility of the corporation and decreases 
asymmetric information problems. Special importance belongs to the duty of loyalty 
which means that board members should demonstrate unlimited loyalty to 
shareholders and to the duty of care which involves commitment, accuracy, and 
diligence of board members in decision making processes. Two-tier board systems 
involve two single independent boards, the management board and the supervisory 
board. The supervisory board monitors the management to ensure the interest of the 
shareholders and acts as a non-executive institution. The management board is self 
dependent, fulfils the tasks of business management, and acts in an executive way. 
One-tier boards are mainly common in the US, the UK, and other Anglo-Saxon 
countries, while two-tier boards are dominant in Continental Europe, as for example in 
Germany or Austria. 
 
The board is the most important internal device to protect the rights of shareholders 
and to keep the management from undertaking inefficient or self-enriching strategies. 
                                                
18 See Conyon and Murphy, 2000 
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Referring to Jensen (2000), problems with corporate internal control systems are 
mainly caused by the insufficient-functioning of the board of directors. Jensen identifies 
major points that bear potential risk of inefficient monitoring. 
Board culture is an important component of a possible monitoring failure. An 
accentuation on politeness and friendliness at the expense of truthfulness and 
directness in boardrooms may cause several failures in the internal control system. 
Although the culture of boards will not follow calls from policy makers, the press, or the 
academic community, it may change in response to new rules and practices by 
legislation or recognize that past practices have resulted in major failures. 
Typically, asymmetric information and information problems limit the efficiency of the 
board in large corporations. Generally, the CEO is better informed about company’s 
day-to-day business than the members of the board, and determines the information 
given to the board. This information asymmetry keeps board members from effectively 
contributing to monitoring tasks and from wise judgment of business strategies. Board 
members should also have the possibility to meet and observe executives that are 
below the CEO to get a broader view of the corporation. Additionally, good advice and 
monitoring requires qualified and skilled board members, and if they lack these 
qualities it is even more difficult to provide competent assistance for management in 
strategic and operational decisions. 
Sometimes boards are motivated by legal liabilities, as for example through class 
action suits by the plain bar and shareholders. Class action suits are often caused by 
unexpected declines in the stock price. In this case, board members are interested 
firstly in minimizing the downside risk and stopping bad publicity, and only secondly in 
maximizing corporate value. 
Additionally, problems arise from the lack of board members’ equity holdings. Outside 
board members who hold material stakes on equity should have better incentives in 
monitoring the corporation. A recent trend to compensate board members through 
stock or stock options is a move towards an effective alignment of interest. 
Oversized boards may suffer from coordination and efficiency problems, following an 
old proverb that ‘too many cooks spoil the broth’. Thus board size should generally not 
exceed seven to eight people. 
Typically in US corporations the CEO also operates as the chairman of the board. The 
chairman initiates and chairs board meetings and controls the process of hiring, firing, 
evaluating, and compensating the CEO. Obviously the CEO cannot perform the 
function of the chairman apart from his personal interests since decisions directly affect 
his own utility. Therefore, it might be better to separate the function of the chairman 
from the CEO and to appoint an independent chairman instead. 
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Active investors have an increased interest in monitoring a corporation, due to their 
large debt or equity stakes in a company. In some corporate governance systems large 
investors can participate actively in the board of directors while in other systems they 
are basically excluded by legislation or by custom. Boards tend to be more powerful 
when they are composed of large shareholders who have incentives to invest the 
resources required for monitoring. 
3.4. The Market for Corporate Control 
Takeovers are part of the economic environment in nearly all developed economies 
and the number of takeovers increased steadily over the last 40 years. Most common 
are friendly takeovers in which the bidder’s offer is made to the management of the 
target company or to its board of directors. Operational, financial, and/or tax synergies 
are supposed to be achieved through the combination of two companies. Altogether, 
an increase in revenues, cost reductions, an increase in dept capacity, the 
establishment of bigger internal capital markets, and tax savings are possible goals of 
such connections. 
 
Though of bigger interest from corporate governance’s point of view are hostile 
takeovers. The market for corporate control is recognized as important mechanism 
through which capital markets ensure the discipline of the management by the threat of 
a takeover in which management is usually replaced. If managers were not maximizing 
the value of the company and impairing performance another party could buy the 
company and obtain the increased value as return to its improved management. A 
hostile takeover is therefore characterized by a tender offer of the bidder to the 
shareholders of the target company, bypassing target’s management. If the offer is 
accepted the bidder acquires control of the target and controls or replaces target’s 
management. 
Charkham (2005) states that takeovers partially served as substitute for effective 
governance. Some hostile takeovers contributed to a respectable rationale-like 
strategic development, while others were mainly opportunistic, especially when a 
bidder realized that stock was trading that low that the company could be dismembered 
at a profit. During the last takeover wave in the 1980s in the US, company managers 
painfully became aware of their vulnerability if they kept on underperforming. The better 
company’s governance works the less likely is an upcoming threat through an 
opportunistic hostile takeover. Although takeovers can be a helpful instrument in 
establishing major changes in a company, they are also an expensive way especially if 
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a few adjustments in business strategy were sufficient and management did not have 
to be replaced. Evidence suggests that even though gains were realized by 
shareholders who sold their shares the value under the new entity was less than the 
sum of the previously individual parts, because the aimed synergies were difficult to 
realize. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) summarize four issues to be concerned about when 
performing a takeover. First, the bidder may have to pay the expected increase in 
profits after the acquisition ex-ante to the shareholders of the target company, for 
otherwise they do not accept the offer and keep their shares to automatically gain the 
expected value after the success of the takeover.19 Second, acquisitions may increase 
agency costs if the bidder overpays for the target in searching private benefits and 
increased control.20 The third issue deals with the great necessity of liquid capital 
markets that supply the bidder with large amounts of capital in a short time. And forth, 
hostile takeovers may be opposed by managerial lobbies making takeovers to 
politically vulnerable mechanisms. 
 
As a cause of the major increase in hostile takeovers various countries slowed or 
stopped hostile bids by legislation and other mechanisms. High ownership 
concentration in Germany, cross-shareholdings and company pyramids in Japan, or 
protective instruments like poison pills21, golden parachutes22, and extremely tight 
ownership structure legislation especially popular in the US minimize current and future 
takeover incentives. Even though these instruments partly restore market- security and 
for sure serve their purpose, Gugler (2001) underlines that the adoption of sanctions 
which limit the probability of takeovers reduces shareholder wealth and social welfare. 
3.5. Product Market Competition 
Competitive product markets contribute to corporate governance in reducing 
opportunistic behavior and disciplining managers who are not maximizing company’s 
profits. In an economy with perfectly competitive markets all companies face similar 
                                                
19 See Grossman and Hart, 1980 
20 See Shleifer and Vishny , 1988 
21 Poison pills are securities that provide their holders with special rights in the case of a hostile takeover. 
Typically poison pills grant the holders of the target’s shares the right to purchase shares in the target or 
the bidder’s company at a steep discount. 
22 Golden parachutes provide cash and non-cash compensation to senior executives upon termination, 
demotion, or resignation following a change in control. 
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factor and labor costs, and product prices quickly react on a change in supply and 
demand. Increasing supply forces companies to optimize their production and 
operation process in order to stay competitive among other companies, to raise 
external capital at the lowest cost, and in order to consequently maximize profits to 
survive. These mechanisms do not leave any space for managers who engage in 
opportunistic behavior and thereby lower company’s performance. 
Though product market competition is a real powerful force toward economic efficiency, 
its disciplining character needs long time to take effect and product markets alone 
cannot solve all concerns of corporate governance. Additionally, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) point out that production capital is typically specific and sunk, and suppliers of 
this capital want to be assured to receive returns on their investments. Product market 
competition reduces the return on capital and lowers the amount that managers can 
possibly expropriate, but it does not keep managers from expropriating the competitive 
return after the capital is sunk. Therefore, additional governance mechanisms have to 
contribute in ensuring shareholder interests. 
3.6. Legal Systems 
Legislation and enforcement of law differ among various countries all around the world. 
Besides legislation, in many countries there also exist multiple statements and codes 
recommending guiding principles of corporate practice. Protection of shareholder and 
creditor rights, observance of manager and board duties, bankruptcy laws, takeover 
restrictions, established standards of business management, and accounting rules add 
to good performance and sound corporate governance.  
 
La Porta et al. (1998b) distinguish between two major legal systems, the common law 
and the civil law system. The common law system includes Anglo-Saxon countries, as 
the UK, the US, Canada, Australia, India, and other former British colonies. The civil 
law system can be divided into and traced back to three origin law families, the French, 
German, and Scandinavian family. French civil law countries are for example France, 
Belgium, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey. German civil law involves countries like 
Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Japan, and South Korea. Finally, Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, and Sweden rank among Scandinavian civil law countries. Common law is 
traditionally formed by judges and precedents from judicial decisions whereas civil law 
is characterized through statutes, orders, and codes as primary means of legal 
constitution. 
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Additionally, La Porta et al. (1998b) analyze legal environments of different countries all 
over the world with respect to efficiency, enforcement, and protective impact of 
particular legal system. Evidence suggests that common law countries provide the 
strongest protection of shareholders, followed by German and Scandinavian civil law 
countries, while French civil law countries offer the weakest protection. High protection 
of shareholder rights should encourage shareholders to invest in companies and 
therefore increase the demand for shares when shareholder protection is high. 
Evidence supports this assumption stating that common law countries have the largest, 
and French and German civil law countries the smallest markets of external capital.23 
Furthermore, dividend payments are on average higher in both common law countries 
and countries with good shareholder protection.24 The protection of creditors is 
strongest in common law countries and weakest in countries of French-origin. The 
highest quality of law enforcement can be found in Scandinavian and Germanic 
countries, followed by common law countries, and finally far behind in French civil law 
countries. The high amount of concentrated ownership in French civil law countries 
might result from the poor performance of these countries. Highly concentrated 
ownership ensures better monitoring possibilities and sustainable exercise of control 
rights to shareholders which is of major importance in the case of both poor legislation 
and insufficient enforcement of laws.  
                                                
23 La Porta et al., 1997 
24 La Porta et al., 1998a 
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4. Corporate Governance Systems 
Based on the two predominant legal systems (the common law and the civil law 
system) and on the resulting legal framework for governing bodies and shareholders 
two different corporate governance systems emerged, the outsider and the insider 
governance system. Both systems vary mainly in their characteristics of ownership 
structure, their distribution of control rights, and in the effectiveness of different 
mechanisms of corporate governance. 
4.1. The Outsider System 
The following characterization of the outsider system is mainly based on Charkham 
(2005), Müller (2003), and Prowse (1994). The outsider system is prevalent in Anglo-
Saxon common law countries with the US and the UK as two typical examples of this 
corporate governance system. In the US the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), founded in 1934, acts as federal regulation mechanism on governing issues 
concerning companies, shareholders, the market, and the relationships among these 
parties. The SEC inter alia published the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 in order to 
provide tougher control on executives, the board of directors, accountants, and 
auditors. In 2003 the British Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance published the Combined Code of Corporate Governance (CCCG) revising 
the Cadbury Report of 1992. The CCCG mainly involves issues on directors, 
remuneration policies, accountability, shareholder relations, and institutional investors 
as active monitoring forces.  
 
Large developed stock markets in the US and the UK serve as external access to 
capital and as important financing instruments of corporate operations. Individuals and 
institutional shareholders, like mutual funds or pension funds, are the most common 
types of ownership in the US and UK. Ownership is widely dispersed and shareholders 
are usually exclusively interested in the value-maximization of their shares. Large 
shareholders hold between a fifth and a quarter of overall outstanding shares which is 
relatively low compared to Germany or Japan. Generally, in the absence of crisis, 
private and institutional investors are largely passive and hardly participate in decision 
making or monitoring. Since attending in annual shareholder meetings is regarded as 
costly and commitment is often missing, proxy voting has become extremely popular, 
especially in the US. Proxy voting means that shareholders can delegate their voting 
rights to another member in who they have confidence to act in their interest. In the 
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case of crisis shareholders can bring in class action suits or derivative suits to ensure 
their rights. 
Banks only play a minor role as shareholders due to several legal restrictions as for 
example the forbiddance of holding large ownership stakes in companies. However, 
banks act as important sources of capital for leveraged-buy-outs or takeovers. 
Additionally, investment banks are crucial analysts of companies’ market values. 
Statements of investment banks that a company is under- or overvalued may be a 
crucial factor causing major restructurings of the company or even a takeover. 
The market for corporate control acts as an external control force on management and 
is highly active in the US and the UK. Excessive takeover waves in the past led to the 
replacement of bad performing and exploitive managers. However, as a cause of the 
major increase in hostile takeovers the US constricted hostile bids by legislation.  
CEOs enjoy an enormous sphere of influence within a company. They not only have 
great power over corporate decisions and operations but also act as chairman of the 
board of directors and are seen as exterior figurehead of their company. Exaggerated 
remuneration packages link the interests of executives to long-term interests of 
shareholders. CEOs are compensated through annual bonuses, stock options, and 
other incentive mechanisms whereas base salary amounts to 31 percent in the UK and 
only to 10 percent in the US.25  
The board of directors, a typical one-tier board, consists of both inside directors who 
are concerned with day-to-day business operations and outside directors who 
undertake the monitoring of the company. The board of directors is seen as 
representative of the shareholders and acts as internal control mechanism. Special 
importance belongs to the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. Although board 
members are elected by shareholders, since ownership is widely dispersed, the board 
is effectively chosen by the CEO. 
Additionally, committees of the board, such as audit committees, nominating 
committees, and compensation committees, play an important role in the outsider 
system. Audit committees have to supervise the external auditor and ensure the 
efficiency of internal control mechanisms. Nominating committees undertake the 
selection of director candidates. The compensation committee engages in 
remuneration policies and guidelines for executive directors. In the US these 
committees are required for listed companies on the NYSE and the NASDAQ while 
fewer requirements are established in the UK. 
 
                                                
25 See Conyon and Murphy, 2000 
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Recapitulatory, the main characteristics of the outsider system are the strong protection 
of investors, a widely dispersed ownership of shares, its market centered character 
through strong and liquid stock markets, the indirect control of shareholders on 
management by electing representatives to the monitoring boards or by voting on 
proposals of the management, and the tight disclosure and transparency guidelines. 
4.2. The Insider System 
The insider system, prevalent in civil law countries, is characterized by concentrated 
ownership, a bank centered character through the major influence of banks as 
shareholders, and the representation of large stakeholders on the supervisory board or 
even on the management board. Due to structural differences, this corporate 
governance system can be divided into two subsystems, the Germanic system, 
common in Germany, Austria, Switzerland and other Continental European countries, 
and the Japanese system, established in Japan. 
4.2.1. The Germanic System 
This section mainly focuses on Boehmer (2001), Müller (2003), and Prowse (1994). 
Concentrated shareholdings are symptomatic, as individuals, families, non-financial 
companies, and banks hold large ownership stakes in a substantial number of 
companies. Large shareholder blocks even in listed companies oftentimes have an 
ownership concentration of up to 40 or 50 percent of total outstanding equity. Group 
structures involving contractual arrangements and pyramids are important devices to 
exert control. In company pyramids control is uni-directional as the flow of command 
follows one direction and control is exercised from the top to the bottom. 26  
The Germanic system relies more on large inside investors and banks as active 
monitors and less on capital markets and outside investors which is common in the US 
and the UK. Large individual shareholders and banks typically have long-term 
commitments to the company and therefore substantial incentives to exercise control 
over the company and to engage in monitoring management. Banks possess sufficient 
knowledge and skills to effectively monitor companies but generally have little incentive 
to act on behalf of other shareholders. In a typical company the amount of debt held by 
                                                
26 Company pyramids can be characterized as follows: Company A owns a controlling interest in company 
B and has representatives on B’s supervisory board. Company B owns a controlling stake in company C 
and positions representatives on C’s supervisory board, and so on. Companies never own shares in 
companies above them in the corporate pyramid, which leads to a unidirectional flow of control.  
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banks exceeds the amount of equity held in the same company. Decisions that are 
maximizing the value of loans often reduce the market value of equity and therefore 
companies should aim for a balance between the value-maximization of debt and the 
value-maximization of equity. 
The market for corporate control, apart from negligible exceptions, is not existent in the 
Germanic system and takeovers only occur as friendly acquisitions. Since the 
concentration of ownership is relatively high hostile takeovers need the support of large 
shareholders to be successful and blockholders might only be in favor of selling their 
shares in immense crisis of the company and as kind of ‘last resort’. 
Boards are typically run as two-tier board systems which involve two single 
independent boards, the management board and the supervisory board. The 
supervisory board monitors management to ensure the interest of the shareholders and 
acts as non-executive institution. The management board is self dependent, fulfils the 
tasks of business management, and acts in an executive way. The members of the 
supervisory board are elected by shareholders in the annual general meeting and 
consist of representatives of large shareholders and employees. Insider managers as 
well as the CEO are excluded from the participation in the supervisory board to prevent 
a domination by the CEO as frequently observed in the US and UK. Banks often hold 
seats on the supervisory board and additionally receive proxy votes from other 
shareholders. In consequence this leads to further empowerment of banks since their 
actual control rights exceed their stake in equity cash flow. 
4.2.2. The Japanese System 
The description of the Japanese system sticks to Müller (2003), Prowse (1994), 
Sakuma (2001), and Suto and Hashimoto (2006). In Japan a widely-established 
ownership structure is the cross-shareholder network, known as keiretsu. In this 
structure companies are linked together through cross-shareholdings among each 
other. In contrast to the Germanic system control in Japan is multi-directional enabling 
each keiretsu company to exercise control over other network companies. Although 
cross-shareholdings only include small stakes in member companies these stakes add 
up to effective control blocks. 
Companies of different industries are centered on a set of financial institutions, typically 
involving a main bank. The main bank holds shares in the member companies of the 
keiretsu group and delegates representatives to their boards. Non-financial companies 
of a keiretsu group have a close link to the product market and tight borrowing links to 
these financial institutions. Therefore, banks are very important shareholders and the 
main source of external capital. Banks act as active investors and monitor 
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management through both being company’s external source of capital and, as stated 
above, their representation on the board.  
The board of directors is elected by the shareholders and consists of both outside and 
inside directors who are members of the management team. Basically, boards are very 
large and insider-oriented although a shift towards outsiders has been observed in 
recent years. In contrast to the main bank which holds a significant number of board 
seats, other large shareholders are usually not presented on the board. The chairman 
of the board is typically an ex-president of the company, has the freedom of 
autonomous decision-making, and is not dependent on the board. Additionally, the 
chairman selects the members of top-management. 
The compensation of top managers is relatively low and structured on a seniority-
based remuneration system. Two third of total compensation consist of the base salary 
although an increase in performance-based incentives can be observed. 
Companies in Japan tend to have lower profits and lower return on equity than 
companies in Continental Europe. Value maximization is not a primary goal since 
companies feel much more liable to their employees and to other stakeholders than to 
performance. Nevertheless, keiretsu companies are hardly exposed to the pressure of 
the capital market since banks act as their primary source of external finance and 
cross-shareholdings guarantee a secure and stable environment. These circumstances 
and legal requirements protect from hostile takeovers and bidders find it extremely 
difficult to obtain a sufficient amount of shares to achieve their goals or fail because of 
tight Japanese legislation. 
Strong regulation on business and industrial activities, governmental intervention, 
especially through the Japanese Ministry of Finance, and tight relationships between 
companies and the government unfortunately also facilitate the corruption in Japan. 
 
After this glimpse at predominant corporate governance systems and the previous 
discussion of general mechanisms of corporate governance in market economies the 
next section provides an outline of economies that first of all had to undergo transition 
processes to change their economic, political, and social system in order to establish 
market conditions. Afterwards, the development from planned to market economy in 
Poland is examined in more detail. 
 27
5. Transition Economies in Eastern Europe 
Transition economies are found in Central and Eastern Europe, as for example in the 
countries of former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, but also in Asia, such as 
China, Thailand, Mongolia, and Vietnam. This section admittedly only focuses on 
transition countries located in Eastern Europe in order to identify main similarities and 
common challenges. 
Transition economies undergo changes in the country’s political and economic system. 
Economic transformations involve a change from centrally-planned economy towards 
market-oriented economy, corporate and tax reforms, and macroeconomic 
stabilizations, while political reforms include changes in the role and structure of the 
state and a turn from socialism to democracy.27 Generally, transition restructuring 
extends over several years involving regresses and unforeseen impediments but finally 
at least some success and upswing. 
After years of restructuring in Eastern Europe Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania terminated their main transition 
process by having sufficiently reached market-oriented standards and joined the 
European Union on 1 May 2004, while Bulgaria and Romania followed on 1 January 
2007. 
 
Political and economic systems of transition countries in Eastern Europe possess basic 
similarities and therefore face related challenges on their transition path. The state had 
to develop market-oriented instruments which initially increased inflation and 
diminished the Gross Demand Product (GDP) but finally resulted in macroeconomic 
stabilization. The liberalization of prices, market operations, and economic activity 
involved a reallocation of resources to their economic use. Tight budget constraints 
should create sufficient incentives to improve efficiency. Additionally, governments had 
to deal with the skepticism of workers who were threatened by the overall change, the 
rising unemployment, and the loss of socialistic benefits. 
In order to implement reform packages, governments had to demonstrate autonomy 
and enforceability of directives. Weak governments were affected by lobbying and rent-
seeking activities of diverse interest groups while strong governments were insensitive 
to such manipulations and succeeded in freely designing and independently setting 
democratic reform packages. Governmental proposals had to pass ex-ante political 
constraints since they had to achieve a majority vote in parliament, within government, 
                                                
27 See Balcerowicz, 2002 
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or within ruling coalitions. Additionally, restructurings and redefinitions faced ex-post 
political constraints especially in the case of negative economic shocks after their 
adoption, that, in particular cases caused a political backlash and policy reversals. 
Therefore, governments had to take both ex-ante and ex-post constraints into account 
by implementing economically sensitive policies.28 
 
Many parts of the former socialistic economy were underdeveloped, inefficient, 
regulated, and controlled by the state. Large state-owned companies, mostly in the 
industrial sector, had to be privatized and restructured to achieve economic efficiency 
and effective corporate management. Special privatization strategies such as mass 
privatization or sometimes also gradual privatization were used in order to transfer 
assets from the state to the private sector. Mass privatizations were carried out through 
a giveaway process of state assets that were redistributed for free or at a steep 
discount among the population. Through this reallocation of ownership from the state to 
the population potential resistance to privatization was averted because people who 
had a stake in a privatized company became personally interested in the success of 
new privatization policies. Additionally, people could participate personally in privatized 
companies based on the deep-seated socialist ideology of ‘the ownership of the 
people’. In most cases company shares were initially non-tradable against money to 
prevent people from converting their shares into cash and thereby opposing 
privatization ex-post. 29 
In the case of direct mass privatization restructuring of a company finally remained in 
the responsibility of the new private owners. Unfortunately, the classic structure of 
diffused ownership tended to be inefficient and unable to guarantee good corporate 
governance and deep corporate restructuring. Private investors hesitated to restructure 
companies due to political uncertainty and large sunk costs. Moreover, companies had 
to struggle for external capital, as bank lending was limited due to low collateral 
securities of companies and because of the initially rudimentary structure of the 
banking sector. Financial markets were weak and illiquid and complicated the supply of 
external finance. Before companies had to close down government sometimes 
intervened by subsidizing and de facto renationalizing these companies in order to 
rescue important industrial companies and to maintain jobs. 
 
As already stated above, the banking sector was undeveloped since former socialistic 
financing had been provided by the state and equity markets had to be rebuilt to slowly 
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establish liquidity and institutional standards. These markets mainly arose through the 
privatization process of state-owned companies. Necessary market infrastructure and 
regulation were either established after privatization to handle the rudimentary stock 
market formation or before privatization to secure a sufficient regulatory framework in 
order to handle the gradual listing of companies. Countries of the latter case generally 
benefitted from higher liquidity and better performance of stock markets than countries 
that chose the former strategy. In the banking sector several banks were privatized, 
central banks and commercial banks were established, and sectoral restrictions on 
specialized banks were removed. In posterior phases of transition also foreign banks 
and joint ventures were granted access to the market.30 Additionally, government had 
to refrain from intervening in financial affairs and credit allocation decisions. Since 
independent banks and financial institutions help solving market failures and monitor 
companies, they played an important role in the screening of companies that were 
undergoing restructuring processes. On the one hand, independent private banks 
carefully monitored companies, supported value maximizing activities, and prevented 
opportunistic borrower behavior. While on the other hand, government dependent 
banks in Eastern Europe frequently were forced to grant loans to companies in distress 
which actually had been hidden subsidies from the state.31 
 
During the transition process existing legislation had to be basically revised, new laws 
were released, and especially the enforcement of the legal framework had to be 
pushed and monitored. Concerning corporate governance, government had to adopt a 
broader view than in traditional market economies including potential problems 
between shareholders and management, creditors and management, minority 
shareholders and blockholders, and shareholders and employees. 
Pistor et al. (2000) analyze various transition economies focusing on shareholder and 
creditor rights in connection with the actual quality of law enforcement and the 
development of external finance. The authors take a critical view on the study of La 
Porta et al. (1998b) who examined connections between law and finance in market 
economies. Pistor et al. argue that in transition economies one has to take more 
variables and individual circumstances into account than in market-based systems and 
therefore present an extended insight on patterns of external finance and legality. 
Since shareholder rights account for the major part of legal regulations Pistor et al. 
include the following issues. In the case of dissatisfaction with management 
shareholders can either raise their voice and control management through voting and 
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information rights or take the exit strategy in selling their shares. Additionally, 
companies with concentrated ownership typically have large blockholders that possess 
the possibility to exercise control on the disadvantage of minority shareholders and 
management. Therefore legal rules, such as cumulative voting rights or a quorum 
requirement for special shareholder meetings have to be established to protect minority 
shareholders against blockholders. Moreover, the integrity of the capital market is 
taken into account, since an independent agency has to monitor the stock market and 
regulations have to prevent self-dealing and insider-trading. 
On the other hand, Creditors serve as important source of external finance and the 
quality of legal protection influences the degree of lending opportunities for companies. 
Pistor et al. examine the following issues: the rights of creditors in the case of 
liquidation and bankruptcy, their ability to control the bankruptcy process, existing ex-
post sanctions on management, management’s liability to creditors, and the 
construction of collateral law. 
Summarizing research results, Pistor et al. (2000) conclude that transition economies 
provide a satisfactory legal framework and widely possess even higher levels of 
shareholder and creditor rights protection than other market economies in Europe. 
However, real effectiveness of legal institutions depends more on the actual 
enforcement of regulations than on the law on the books and the enforcement of these 
rights is unfortunately relatively low in transition economies. In countries where 
voluntary compliance to regulations is high enforcement by the state is not that exigent 
than in countries where voluntary compliance is low and credible threats are missing. 
The degree of legality actually drives the quality of corporate governance and the 
development of financial markets and finally influences the success of transition. 
Therefore, an effective system of external finance requires the credible commitment 
that laws are sufficiently enforced and economic and financial players have to 
practically and morally support existing regulations. 
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6. Poland’s Development During and After 
Transition 
Poland was the first country in Eastern Europe that introduced severe reforms to shape 
its policy and economy in order to leave the socialistic regime and its ideology behind. 
After the fall of the ‘iron curtain’ in 1989 one main goal was to establish liberalized, 
competitive, and stable market economy in order to create a competitive environment 
and to reintegrate in prevalent European social and political structures. The following 
sections closely examine those changes and provide an overlook over various reform 
processes in Poland. 
6.1. Economic Development 
Kochanowicz et al. (2004) provide a comprehensive analysis of the economic reform 
process in Poland. In October 1989 the Polish government presented the ‘Balcerowicz 
Plan’, named after Poland’s finance minister Leszek Balcerowicz, to herald economic 
transition. These reforms aimed to achieve macroeconomic stabilization and the 
liberalization of national economy by removing main price controls and encouraged the 
building of market-oriented institutions. This ‘shock therapy’ implied strict budgetary 
and monetary constraints. Control possibilities for banks and suppliers were enlarged 
to improve market efficiency and control mechanisms over corporate operations. The 
fiscal system was reformed including the introduction of a corporate income tax, a 
value-added tax, and a personal income tax. 
 
Foreign trade was restructured, tariffs were lowered, trade licenses were abolished, 
and markets were opened to foster international competition. Trade structures were 
realigned and Poland clearly began focusing on Western trade markets. In 1990 
exports to the EU and EFTA represented 60.5 percent and exports to the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern European countries amounted to 23.7 percent of total exports. After 
a short reversion of this trade liberalization by an overall rise in tariffs in 1991 
government kept on gradually reducing tariffs during the following years. 
In the 1990s imports were growing much faster than exports leading to a six times 
increase in imports and a duplication of exports from 1990 to 1998. Since 2000 this 
relationship approximately balanced and the trade deficit slightly declined.32 Member 
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countries of the European Union were in the past and are still most important trading 
partners of Poland. The dominant partner in both import and export is Germany 
whereas additionally France, Italy, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium, 
and the Czech Republic rank among main trading parties. Additionally, Russia and the 
Ukraine maintain trading relations with Poland. In 2006 export amounted to 109.584 
billion US Dollar compared to 41.009 billion US Dollar in 2002, while import increased 
from 55.112 to 125.645 billion US Dollar.33 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) also contributed to the economical transition in Poland. 
Domestic markets benefited from transfer of technology, economies of scale, the 
integration of domestic production into a global economic network, and the growth of 
intra-industry trade. Wholly-owned investments, implying a 100 percent foreign 
ownership, enjoyed great popularity and were favored over joint ventures, especially in 
the case of foreign superior firm-specific technologies or outstanding marketing skills. 
Moreover, FDI positively influenced the efficiency of recently privatized or newly 
founded companies by improving governance practices within these companies and by 
establishing new organizational and management forms. Foreign investments were 
attracted by the huge unsatisfied demand for goods and services and great market 
opportunities in Poland. Investors primarily focused on food, beverage, tobacco, and 
cosmetic industries and companies such as Coca Cola, United Biscuits, Philip Morris, 
Unilever, and Nestle entered the market to supply the existing excess demand. The 
service sector as well attracted numerous foreign companies which were investing 
especially in trade, retail, and consumer services.34 
Although the Polish market had already been opened in 1990 it took some years until 
the value of FDI inflows increased significantly. In order to foster economic 
development by an increase in foreign investments the Polish Information and Foreign 
Investment Agency35 (Polska Agencja Informacji i Inwestycji Zagranicznych S.A. - 
PAIiIZ) was established in 1993. PAIiIZ should attract and encourage foreign 
corporations to invest in Poland by offering them assistance in legal and administrative 
procedures, finding both investment locations and suitable business partners, and 
advising companies during the initial investment process. 
Nowadays FDI is still of main importance for Poland’s economy and came up with a 
total sum of 13.922 US Dollar in 2006 and an increase by 45 percent compared to 
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2005. Approximately 82.7 percent of the FDI inflow in 2006 came from member 
countries of the European Union which are important players in investing abroad.36 
 
In the early 1990s the Polish Złoty was stabilized by the introduction of a fixed 
exchange rate against the US Dollar and later on the currency was revalorized in order 
to increase the stability of the Złoty-Dollar exchange rate. In 2000 this fixed exchange 
rate was replaced by a clean float policy which enabled the valuation of the Złoty in 
relation to other currencies by free market forces. 
 
Poland was a pioneer among other Eastern European transition countries, experienced 
the smallest output decline among those economies, and was the first country that 
ended its recession and returned to growth in the early 1990s. After an initial fall of the 
GDP growth rate to -11.6 percent in 1990 and -7 percent in 1991 economy recovered 
in 1992 facing an increase to 2.6 percent. Between 1995 and 1997 the GDP growth 
rate ranged between 6 and 7 percent but declined thereafter and dropped to 1.1 
percent in 2001. After this downturn economy regained its strength in 2003 and finally 
achieved an annual GDP growth rate of 5.8 percent in 2006. 37 
 
Ominous high inflation was brought under control and decreased enormously over the 
past years. At the beginning of the transition process annual inflation amounted to 
585.8 percent in 1990, fell to 70.3 percent in 1992, and almost halved to 43 percent in 
1992. Thenceforward, inflation kept on decreasing steadily to 10.1 percent in 2000, 
was under 5 percent in the following five years, and finally amounted to 1.3 percent in 
2006.38 
 
Drawing a balance of the first years under restructuring the new market orientation not 
only involved economic benefits but also contributed to a manifold accessibility of 
goods and services and a higher standard of living. Though, reforms of the state 
machinery, including public administration and legislative operations, and reforms of 
social services lagged behind the success of political and economic reforms. Several 
reforms were undertaken in 1999 creating overdue enhancements in the public 
administration, pension, health care, and education system. The impact of these 
reforms, however, was insufficient and there is still a need for further improvements. 
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Additionally, Poland has to reduce high unemployment and the large difference in the 
distribution of incomes, counteract undercapitalization of small and medium-sized 
corporations, and deal with the low innovation rate and the underdevelopment of the 
transportation infrastructure. Furthermore, corruption is still a problem in Poland and it 
will take additional time and efforts to eliminate this deep-seated behavior. 
6.2. The Privatization Process 
The following characterization of the privatization process in Poland mainly focuses on 
Nellis (2002) and on Kozarzewski (2006). Several pre-transition reforms in the 1980s 
tried to overcome decreasing rates of return on investments by decentralizing decision 
processes to the corporate level. The autonomy of companies and managers was 
increased but only resulted in marginal gains of cost reduction. Additionally, employee 
councils were created to empower employees in negotiations with the management 
and decision-making processes were downscaled to the company level to unburden 
the weak state sector. 
In 1990 radical reforms in the corporate sector were established to herald a period of 
extensive privatization of state-owned companies and to create ownership structures 
that were modeled on those of industrialized countries. The speed of privatization and 
ownership transformation mainly depended on the company size, industry sector, 
organizational structure, and the profitability of particular companies. 
 
The privatization of small companies was carried out rapidly and was nearly completed 
by the end of 1992, having privatized 97 percent of these corporations. These 
companies were often operating in retail trade and in the service sector and company 
shares were distributed to employees at a discount. This small-scale privatization was 
regarded as a success since it improved the quantity and quality of provided products 
and services and created a large number of new jobs. 
Another way was the privatization through liquidation. This strategy allowed companies 
in bad economic positions to sell their assets usually to insiders or lease them out, to 
enter into joint ventures or merge with other corporations. Thereby, especially small 
and start-up enterprises were supplied with assets and real estate they required to 
continue business operations. 
 
The privatization of medium and large state-owned companies implicated far more 
problems and proceeded not as fast as initially intended. There were protracted 
debates and it took several drafts until the Act on Privatization of State-owned 
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Enterprises was passed in 1990. Following an indirect privatization model, large state-
owned companies were first commercialized by changing companies’ legal forms and 
establishing the Ministry of Treasury as sole shareholder. In a second step, company 
shares were allocated through public offerings, were sold to strategic investors, or were 
included into the National Investment Fund (NIF) program. 
Mass privatization was introduced in 1993 to speed up privatization and offer people 
additional possibilities to participate in the reform and restructuring process. Initially, 
512 medium and large-sized state-owned companies were converted into joint-stock 
companies and allocated to 15 NIFs. NIFs were typically managed by qualified 
international companies and should shift Polish companies towards market orientation 
before they were privatized. Sixty percent of each company were held by NIFs; 30 
percent remained at the State Treasury, and finally ten percent of shares were 
distributed for free among employees of the company. Additionally, vouchers were 
distributed as kind of share-give-aways. Vouchers allowed people to buy shares of 
NIFs for a small fee and therefore people were able to gain indirect ownership on the 
companies held by NIFs. However, the voucher system was not started until 1995 and 
shares of these funds were not listed until the first half of 1997. This illustrates the 
intense and continuing difficulty of privatization and restructuring procedures of medium 
and large-sized companies. 
 
In 1997 an enhanced regulatory framework on privatization came into force and was 
based on the new Act on Commercialization and Privatization of State-owned 
Enterprises. It treated both the privatization process and initial corporate governance 
mechanisms, including issues of ownership structure and the formation of corporate 
governance instruments. According to this Act, the Ministry of the State Treasury had 
to regulate privatization processes and had to create these new internal task-oriented 
structures. 
This Act repealed former regulations wherein privatizations had needed the approval of 
both the management and employee councils of state-owned companies. Additionally, 
the limit of 10 percent of shares acquirable by employees was raised to 15 percent. 
Direct privatization and the role of insiders concerning ownership transformation were 
limited to certain degrees, depending on company size, employment level and the 
number of assets. Moreover, outside investors should hold at least 20 percent of 
shares of the privatized company and the possibilities for legal persons to participate in 
the company were increased. 
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In 2004 and 2005 additional privatizations were pressed ahead by the new Minister of 
the State Treasury accompanied by market-oriented reforms and further developments 
in the private sector. 
 
Recapitulatory, Poland’s privatization process took more time than expected but was in 
general successful. Good economic and financial policies in connection with the slow 
privatization of large-sized companies contributed to this success. Basic functions of 
corporate governance such as the initial supervision of companies by employee 
councils and the professional restructuring executed by NIFs were advantageous for 
the course of the privatization process. 
Nevertheless, in 2005 there still existed about 500 large companies that were only 
commercialized but not privatized and about 100 companies that were majority owned 
by the State Treasury holding ownership stakes of more than 50 percent. These cases 
of unfinished privatization should be completed in the following years to gain further 
improvement and higher efficiency. 
6.3. The Banking System 
Under the communist regime the banking system was composed of a national 
monobank undertaking retail and commercial transactions and two specialized banks 
handling foreign exchange operations. The National Bank of Poland (NBP), dependent 
on political and administrative decisions, equaled the status of a monopoly regarding 
loans, savings, and currency regulations. During communism the Polish Złoty was an 
exclusively internal currency and not convertible into other currencies. 
 
If not stated differently, the description of the Polish banking system and its 
restructuring efforts focuses on the analysis of Orłowski (1999). In the course of 
political reforms in the late 1980s and the early 1990s the monobank was split up into 
several independent financial institutions. Although the National Bank of Poland kept its 
status as central bank sections and departments of the bank were cut off and 
established as separate commercial banks. Basically, these banks were burdened with 
troubled assets and needed support and refinancing by the NBP. 
Between 1990 and 1992 successful stabilization and liberalization policies were 
initiated such as the establishment of a basic legal framework concerning commercial 
banking and the liberalization of entry modes, interest rates, and product markets. 
Lowered entry conditions for new institutions led to an increased number of new 
commercial banks also including foreign entries. Furthermore, regulations on capital 
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adequacy ratios of 8 percent for new banks and later additionally for state banks were 
established. In order to solve stock market and liquidity problems bank restructuring 
and recapitalization was tied to company restructuring. In 1992 the Ministry of Finance 
restricted the market entry of foreign banks and started to develop loan recovery and 
debtor restructuring plans by cutting off loans to troubled companies.39 
In 1993 a recapitalization plan on classified debts was initiated which intended to keep 
on restructuring of the banking system by changes in bank operations and company 
relations in return for a recapitalization of funds. To strengthen the institutional power of 
the banking sector and to prepare privatizations many small commercial banks were 
consolidated in 1993. Since 1993 Polish banks experienced gradual growth and better 
quality of assets. 
In 1995 a redenomination of the Polish Złoty was performed which enabled the 
formation of the exchange rate on the foreign exchange market and made the Złoty 
convertible according to international standards. 
In 1996 the so called ‘bank conciliation’ facilitated restructuring negotiations between 
companies and main creditors and helped to restructure 23 percent of companies and 
50 percent of debt. Additionally, foreign and domestic restructuring specialists directed 
task forces in each bank and Polish experts took an active part in the management 
board of these banks.40 
The continuing of bank consolidations and privatizations in 1996 and 1997 enhanced 
the structure of the banking system. The new constitution improved the position of the 
NBP among public institutions and the Monetary Policy Council, a new entity of the 
NBP, gained responsibility for monetary policies. Thenceforward, the supervision of the 
stability of the financial system and of the development of the Złoty became one of the 
primary objectives of the national bank. The Commission for Banking Supervision was 
entrusted with the supervision of banks, supported by an executive body, the General 
Inspectorate of Banking Supervision, which was an autonomous entity within the NBP. 
 
After a period of about ten years transition reforms in the banking sector were nearly 
completed and a well-organized banking system had been established. During the 
preparation of the entry in the European Union on 1 May 2004 the NBP inter alia 
advanced the liberalization of capital flows, deepened the supervision of profitability of 
banks and financial institutions, enhanced the institutional infrastructure, and checked 
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the technical and economical readiness of the domestic banking sector to compete on 
international European markets.41 
After the successful joining of the European Union the Polish banking system 
benefitted from the increasing effectiveness and competitiveness of particular banks, 
greater safety of bank assets, higher standards of protection, better deposit 
guarantees, and an overall increase in stability. 
6.4. The Capital Market 
According to the historical overview presented on the homepage of the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange42 (WSE) the first stock exchange in Warsaw, the Warsaw Mercantile 
Exchange, was opened in May 1817. At that time main business involved the trading of 
bonds, bills, and other debt instruments. Trading in equities developed in the second 
half of the twentieth century and before the Second World War approximately 90 
percent of the trade volume of the Polish market was handled by this exchange. After 
the end of the Second World War the communist regime did not reactivate the stock 
exchange since there was no more need for private capital markets. 
 
In 1989 due to the change in the political regime and to economic restructuring plans, 
government began to reestablish market-oriented structures and therefore also capital 
markets. Based on the Act on Public Trading in Securities and Trust Fund of March 
1991 the WSE was founded by the State Treasury on 16 April 1991 as non-profit joint-
stock company. Experience and financial support was provided by the French Société 
des Bourses Françaises. On the first trading day only five stocks were listed, seven 
brokerages took part, and there were 112 buy and sell orders. 
During the first years the WSE faced start-up difficulties since only a few numbers of 
companies were listed on the exchange, trading sessions were limited, and many parts 
of the structure of the exchange were underdeveloped. Most of the stock market 
growth of the 1990s occurred between 1996 and 1998. At the end of 1998 the stock 
market capitalization amounted to eight percent of the GDP and even doubled 
compared to 1996. In 1999 more than 200 companies were listed on the free market of 
the WSE and additionally the largest privatized Polish company Polski Koncern 
Naftowy made its debut on the stock exchange. 
In the following years, the WSE became a member of the Federation of European 
Stock Exchanges, signed an agreement on cooperation with the London Stock 
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Exchange and the Paris Bourse, and entered into a cross-membership and a cross-
access agreement with Euronext. In 2003, the first foreign company, Bank Austria 
Creditanstalt AG, was listed on the WSE followed by several other Central and Eastern 
European corporations. 
In 2004 the WSE joined the Federation of European Securities Exchanges. 
Simultaneously with the entry in the European Union on 1 May 2004, the WSE adopted 
a new market structure that divided listings into the official market (main market) and 
the regulated unofficial market (parallel market) in order to govern each market by a 
diverse set of regulations. Listing requirements of the main market inter alia contain the 
admittance to public trading, unrestricted transferability of securities, the coverage by a 
listing application, financial statements of at least three years, and the dispersion of 
shares. The parallel market demands admittance to public trading, unrestricted 
transferability of securities, and absence of bankruptcy and liquidation proceedings. 
In 2002 and 2005, the WSE released recommendations of Best Practices of Corporate 
Governance to enhance the transparency of listed companies. The latest version of 
these recommendations came into force on 1 January 2008 and is intended to improve 
the development of Polish economy, to provide best quality of trading operations and 
exchange products, and to create higher transparency, effectiveness and liquidity of 
Polish securities. 
In 2005 three regulations were established to amend the obsolete legislation on the 
trading of public securities: the Act on Public Offering, Conditions Governing the 
Introduction of Financial Instruments to Organized Trading, and Public Companies - the 
Act on Trading in Financial Instruments - and the Act on Capital Market Supervision. 
In 2006 the WSE agreed to comply with the European Code of Conduct for Clearing 
and Settlement which aims to improve transparency of prices for trading, clearing, and 
settlement actions and plays an important role in the integration of financial markets. Its 
fully implementation proceeded on 1 January 2008. 
 
Nowadays the WSE ranks among the best established stock exchanges of the 
European market and the Polish stock market is one of the largest in Eastern Europe 
but still relatively small compared to stock markets in other European countries. By now 
shares, bonds, subscription rights, allotment certificates, investment certificates, and 
derivative instruments such as futures, options, and index participation units are traded 
on the WSE. 
In 2007, 305 domestic and 23 foreign companies were listed on the main market while 
23 domestic companies were found in the parallel market constituting to a total number 
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of 351 listed companies. The total market capitalization of domestic and foreign 
companies amounted to 108.026 billion Polish Złoty.43  
 
The WSE is still majority owned by the State Treasury which holds a stake of 98.81 
percent while additional shareholders are brokerage houses, banks, and a listed 
company. It is planned to privatize the WSE so that the State Treasury should reduce 
its stake to 51 percent in 2008 and should mainly sell its shares to institutional 
investors. After two to three years the State Treasury should completely retreat and the 
privatization process of the WSE should be completed. 
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7. Corporate Governance in Poland 
In course of the overall economic reform process, the privatization wave, and the 
restructuring of companies the attempt to create efficiency and productivity raised the 
need for a sufficient corporate governance system. 
Kochanowicz et al. (2004) point out that the practice of privatization, the speed and 
effects of restructuring, the law on the securities market and its development, the 
market-oriented configuration of corporate goals, and the interests of dominant owners 
all together influenced the formation of the Polish governance structure. Economic and 
social considerations had to be taken into account by designing a new corporate 
governance model. On the one hand, there were large amounts of shares distributed to 
the population in consequence of mass privatization schemes and on the other hand, 
there was still a large scale of employee participation and self-management. Most 
state-owned companies had stable structures of power and influence assignment and 
insiders were afraid of loosing those privileges. To avoid conflicts with these parties 
and to leverage privatization strong insider control mechanisms were retained. 
Moreover, the provision of internal monitoring was important since external control 
mechanisms as financial and product markets or takeovers were weak and nascent. 
Strategic foreign and later also domestic investors had significant more influence than 
minority shareholders due to the diminishing investment potential of the Polish 
population. Strategic investors provided companies with capital, technologies, and a 
new management and business culture. 
Thus, the insider system as prevalent in many countries of Central Europe seemed to 
suit best individual circumstances observed in the country’s present and background. 
However, there are several divergences from the classic model of the insider system 
caused by ideological and political considerations and by the pressure from actors of 
the country’s corporate governance setting. Basic differences, unique in Eastern 
Europe, can be observed concerning whether a company was newly set up or 
originated from the former state-owned sector. For example, there is no general 
legislation to include representatives of employees or other stakeholders in the 
supervisory board since the topic of the representation of stakeholder interests is 
subject to privatization legislation. 
 
The following pages provide a deeper insight on specific patterns of the Polish 
corporate governance system by examining existing regulations and recommendations 
on governance practices and by analyzing important mechanisms of corporate 
governance. 
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7.1. Regulatory Framework 
In general, legal foundations of Polish corporate governance provide an ample field of 
regulations with especially strong disclosure and transparency requirements that are in 
some cases even tighter than in Central European countries. However, there are 
several insufficiencies as pointed out by Kozarzewski (2003). One criticism involves the 
lack of concrete and practical solutions of given situations, since the Polish corporate 
governance legislation focuses more on general principles than on particular 
circumstances. This leads to several insufficiencies especially in a country like Poland 
with only short-time experience in market economy. Secondly, the protective device 
which regulates governance mechanisms within companies is insufficient causing the 
abuse of minority interests by powerful industrial parties and facilitating opportunistic 
behavior of managers.  
Besides legal framework, Pistor et al. (2000) point out that even though legislation in 
Eastern European transition countries provides manifold regulations and principles of 
corporate governance there are problems concerning the weak enforcement of these 
laws and the general structure of the judicial system. 
 
The most important legislative framework for Polish companies is provided in the 
Commercial Company Code (CCC). The CCC, enacted in 1934, was updated and 
modified on 15 September 2000 and came into force on 1 January 2001. The CCC 
provides regulations on the establishment and operation of companies and deals with 
general corporate issues, duties and rights of the management and supervisory board, 
shareholder and creditor rights, mergers and acquisitions, and liquidation activities. 
 
In order to establish further principles of corporate governance and to close the gaps 
between legislation and practice several institutions promoted additional issues and 
recommendations on good corporate governance. Most important contributors are 
described below. 
 
The Gdańsk Institute for Market Economics (GIME) which acts as an independent non-
governmental scientific research institution published the Corporate Governance Code 
for Polish Listed Companies44 in 2002. The Code was drafted by Maciej Dzierzanowski 
and Piotr Tamowicz based on discussions, analyses, and proposals of a working group 
consisting of several economic experts, advisors, and representatives of public joint-
stock companies. Moreover, it is geared to principles and recommendations of good 
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governance practice issued in other countries or by international organizations, such as 
the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, the EASD Corporate Governance 
Principles, British corporate governance codes, and guidelines issued by 
Euroshareholders. 
The Polish Corporate Governance Code aims to protect minority shareholders and 
their co-determination rights and longs for a balance of all stakeholder rights within the 
company. Additionally, it deals with problems associated with both concentrated and 
dispersed ownership and it recommends the strengthening of the supervisory board in 
relationships with the management board and with dominant majority shareholders. It 
promotes the increase of transparency concerning the accessibility of corporate 
information and the trustworthiness of auditing but dissociates from extensive anti-
takeover defenses. 
Public joint-stock companies have to report their compliance or non-compliance with 
the recommendations of the Polish Corporate Governance Code in the event of listing 
on the WSE. Moreover, the Polish Forum for Corporate Governance publishes an 
annual rating of good corporate governance practice using the Code as benchmark. 
 
The Polish Forum for Corporate Governance (PFCG) was established by the Gdańsk 
Institute for Market Economics in 2001. The PFCG provides discussion, analysis, and 
recommendations on corporate governance issues and aims to create a knowledge 
base on corporate governance in order to support good practice. Moreover, it values 
the efficiency of Polish corporate governance mechanisms within companies. 
The PFCG is cross-linked with several other organizations to exchange governance 
issues and to attain access to a broad international network. The three main partners 
are the State Committee for Scientific Research (KBN), a governmental body set up by 
the Polish Parliament as authority in the area of science and technology; the Centre for 
International Private Enterprise (CIPE), a non-profit organization of the US Chamber of 
Commerce; and the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), an international 
scientific association providing research, analyzes, and country specific information on 
corporate governance issues. 45 
 
The WSE adopted the Best Practices in Public Companies in 2002 in order to establish 
further instructions on governance issues. The Best Practices should strengthen 
corporate governance regulations, foster a competitive market environment and 
increase the attractiveness of the exchange market in general. In 2005 the Best 
Practices Committee of the WSE amended the initial draft by taking experiences and 
                                                
45 See Polish Forum for Corporate Governance, http://www.pfcg.org.pl/en/ 
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suggestions of market participants into account and by including recommendations of 
the European Communion. 
On 1 January 2008 the Code of Best Practice for WSE Listed Companies46 came into 
force and represents the third revision of these recommendations. In comparison to the 
Best Practices of 2005 several points were removed to disburden companies and to 
exclude issues that were less significant for shareholder wealth and company value in 
the opinion of the WSE. The current Code aims to improve transparency of corporate 
operations and enhances the quality of information access and communicational 
features. Additionally, it intends to improve the protection of shareholder rights and 
provides recommendations concerning the management and supervisory board. 
Companies listed on the WSE have to state whether they comply with the principles of 
the Code or whether they do not comply with singular points and explain the particular 
reasons for this behavior. The WSE undertakes several efforts to promote the 
acceptance and compliance of the Code of Best Practices and annually awards listed 
companies which fully comply with their principles of corporate governance. 
7.2. Mechanisms of Corporate Governance 
7.2.1. Ownership Structure 
The following characteristics of Polish ownership structure mainly refer to Kochanowicz 
et al. (2004) and Tamowicz (2006). Initially, listed companies evolved from 
privatizations of state-owned corporations in the context of overall restructurings during 
Poland’s transition process. Early privatizations from 1990 to 1993 aimed to create 
dispersed ownership using initial public offerings (IPOs) to attract numerous individual 
investors. Considerable amounts of shares were transferred to employees and other 
individuals and granted them participation and influence on privatized companies. 
Since many individuals were addressed by share-give-aways concentrated ownership 
was only moderate at that time and amounted to about 18 percent. One indeed 
negative example of this restructuring method was the privatization of the Bank Ślaşki, 
one of the largest retail banks in Poland, which ended in a disaster. Individual investors 
were allowed to buy only a marginal amount of shares and immediately sold them after 
purchase. The consequence of this behavior was a market crash shortly after the 
flotation of Bank Ślaşki shares. 
                                                
46 See Code of Best Practice for WSE Listed Companies, 2007 
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During the mid 1990s the privatization strategy changed due to major criticism and only 
moderate outcomes. From then on, government strategy combined public floatation 
with direct sales of large ownership stakes to foreign strategic investors. Therefore, 
concentrated ownership is common in large-sized companies that were privatized 
indirectly through several intermediate steps. Compared to the concentration of voting 
blocks between 1991 and 1996 the influence of large blockholders doubled in the 
following years and reached 39 percent in 2000. This dimension hardly changed in the 
last few years and high ownership concentration is still prevalent in Poland. 
 
In order to specify the current ownership structure in Poland the concentration of 
ownership stakes by industry sectors and the identity of the largest shareholders are 
analyzed in a sample of 182 listed companies. The data used for these analyses derive 
from the pan-European database Amadeus and were evaluated in the years 2006 and 
2007. 
 
Primarily, the ownership stakes of the three largest shareholders are grouped by 
industry sectors. The 182 listed companies are divided into 15 categories and coded 
according to Nace Rev 1.1 which is a statistical classification of economic activities in 
the European Community. In order to present the percentage of the ownership stakes 
of the three largest shareholders by each industry sector the mean, median, and the 
standard deviation of specific stake sizes are listed in Table 1. 
Enterprises of the sectors ‘agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing’, ‘public administration, 
defense’, and ‘education’ are not represented in the sample of 182 listed companies. 
Other industry sectors such as ‘mining’, ‘electricity, gas, water supply’, ‘hotels, 
restaurants’, ‘financial intermediation’, ‘health, social works’, and ‘other services’ 
include only one to five companies in each case. In the latter two sectors there are the 
highest ownership stakes with respect to the largest shareholder that amount to 55.27 
and 51.85 percent of shares. However, due to the low numbers of sample companies 
these values are not very significant. 
Table 1 shows that most listed companies operate in the ‘manufacturing’ sector which 
is represented by 85 entries. In this sector the largest shareholder controls 33.66 
percent (mean: 34.80 percent) of ownership stakes and the second and third largest 
shareholders own a median percentage of 12.79 and 7.67 (mean: 13.82 and 8.45 
percent). The ‘wholesale, retail trade’ and ‘real estate, renting’ sectors have 37 and 21 
entries of listed companies and the largest shareholder holds a median value of 34.08 
and 27.60 percent (mean: 37.80 and 32.92 percent). Within these both sectors the 
stakes of the second largest owner are relatively high compared to other sectors and 
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amount to 17.03 and 14.66 percent (mean: 18.78 and 17.21 percent). Furthermore, 16 
‘construction’ and 10 ‘transport, storage, communication’ companies are represented in 
the sample and show median ownership concentrations of 36.41 and 40.80 percent 
(mean: 37.50 and 40.08 percent) with regard to the largest shareholder. 
Overall, independent from industry sectors, the stake of the largest shareholder 
amounts to the median value of 35.17 percent (mean: 36.42 percent) while the second 
and third largest shareholders own 13.83 and 7.67 percent (mean: 15.57 and 8.62 
percent) of outstanding shares in Polish listed companies. 
Table 1: Ownership Concentration of Three Largest Shareholders by Industry 
Largest SH in % 2nd largest SH in % 3rd largest SH in % 
Code Industry sectors N 




Forestry, Fishing - - - - - - - - - - 
10-14 Mining 1 41.78 41.78 - 6.61 6.61 - 5.29 5.29 - 
15-37 Manufacturing 85 34.80 33.66 18.59 13.82 12.79 6.65 8.45 7.67 4.46 
40-41 Electricity, Gas,  Water Supply 5 45.63 31.30 26.47 14.28 14.25 6.63 10.44 11.20 6.63 
45 Construction 16 37.50 36.41 4.22 13.72 11.74 7.94 8.61 9.94 4.22 
50-52 Wholesale, Retail trade, Repair 37 37.80 34.08 20.22 18.78 17.03 11.62 7.84 7.02 5.14 
55 Hotels, Restaurants 1 35.58 35.58 - 10.04 10.04 - 9.39 9.39 - 
60-64 Transport, Storage, Communication 10 40.08 40.80 18.05 16.18 16.08 9.56 7.22 8.36 3.97 
65-67 Financial intermediation 3 34.36 37.25 18.71 9.77 8.04 2.57 8.29 7.44 2.37 
70-74 Real estate, Renting, Business activities 21 32.92 27.60 16.17 17.21 14.66 8.79 12.21 12.12 5.75 
75 Public administration, Defense - - - - - - - - - - 
80 Education - - - - - - - - - - 
85 Health, Social work 1 55.27 55.27 - 13.09 13.09 - 6.55 6.55 - 
90-93 Other Services 2 51.85 51.85 0.85 18.45 18.45 5.56 5.15 5.15 2.14 
95,99 Others - - - - - - - - - - 
 Total 182 36.42 35.17 18.98 15.57 13.83 9.28 8.62 7.67 4.98 




The second analysis of the 182 sample companies aims to identify the identity of the 
largest shareholder and is presented in Table 2. Therefore, companies are grouped 
with regard to their largest shareholder into several categories which are individuals or 
families, financial companies such as banks, funds, and insurance companies, non-
financial companies, and the state. The stakes of the largest shareholder are 
expressed by the mean, median, and the standard deviation in each specific category 
of ownership identity. 
Most listed companies (71 entries) are controlled by individuals or families who, as 
largest shareholder, hold a median stake of 35.67 percent (mean: 36.99 percent). 
Likewise, non-financial companies, especially industrial companies (66 entries), are 
among most common largest shareholders and hold a median value of 37.25 percent 
of outstanding shares (mean: 39.73 percent). 
The category of 36 financial companies subdivides into 19 banks, three insurance 
companies, seven mutual or pension funds, and five other financial companies. These 
seven other financial companies hold 50.69 percent of stakes (mean: 51.96 percent) 
while mutual or pension funds control 20.01 percent (mean: 30.57 percent). Banks only 
possess 15.19 percent (mean: 17.03 percent) and the three insurance companies bring 
up the rear with 5.60 percent of shares (mean: 6.57 percent) which is extremely low 
since this ownership stakes corresponds to the position of the largest shareholder. The 
state or public authorities are the majority shareholders of only 8 companies of this 
sample but represent the highest median ownership stake among analyzed companies 
which amounts to 46.65 percent (mean: 52.36 percent). 
Table 2: Ownership Concentration by Identity of Largest Shareholder 
Stake of largest shareholder in % Identity of largest shareholder N 
Mean Median StdDev 
Individual(s) or family(ies) 71 36.99 35.67 17.37 
     
Financial companies 36 25.58 19.08 19.66 
 Banks 19 17.03 15.19 10.64 
 Insurance companies 3 6.57 5.60 3.22 
 Mutual / Pension funds 7 30.57 20.01 14.05 
 Other financial companies 7 51.96 50.69 20.09 
     
Non-financial companies 67 39.73 37.25 16.88 
 Foundation/Research Institute 1 29.99 29.99 - 
 Industrial companies 66 39.88 38.28 16.96 
     
State, Public authorities 8 52.36 46.65 22.66 
Total 182    
Data Source: Amadeus Database 
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With respect to corporate governance, companies with high ownership concentration 
and dominant foreign investors tend to have better control and governance structures 
than companies with low levels of ownership concentration. Especially, companies with 
a high percentage of foreign ownership have transparent corporate governance 
structures and a clear division of powers among the management board, the 
supervisory board, and the general meeting of shareholders. Foreign dominated 
companies also introduced incentive-based remuneration systems for managers, in the 
form of share grants or seats on the supervisory board. 
 
Institutional investors, such as pension funds, investment funds, and banks are 
important instruments that undertake monitoring and screening activities on corporate 
performance and corporate management and therefore contribute to the abidance of 
good corporate governance. However, institutional investors should extend their role in 
the Polish governance system and should contribute more actively in supervising and 
monitoring corporate governance. 
Pension funds were established at the end of the 1990s and are usually assisted by 
international institutional investors. Since the Polish pension sector is quite young 
funds only have marginal experience on governance. Funds often face themselves 
internal corporate governance problems such as conflicts of interest, insider trading, or 
troubles in voting policy. Additionally, regulations on inventing abroad, a minimum 
requirement on the rate of return, and current market structure restrict pension funds 
from playing a more active role in corporate governance. However, in the past some 
large funds contributed in corporate governance conflicts that led to the replacement of 
the management or supervisory board. 
Investment funds such as venture capital and private equity funds are more involved in 
corporate governance practices. Since most of these funds are from abroad and linked 
to international investors fund managers possess sufficient experience and ensure 
efficient performance. They contributed in the improvement of the position of the 
supervisory board and advised inter alia the appointment of independent board 
members and the auditor. Furthermore, investment funds developed their own 
corporate governance practices relevant to their portfolio companies. 
The role of banks concerning the establishment of corporate governance issues is 
comparably low and their involvement in control is below European standards. 
7.2.2. Protection of Minority Shareholders 
Since ownership concentration in Poland is relatively high the rights of minority 
shareholders have to be especially considered to protect them from opportunistic 
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behavior of managers and blockholders and to guarantee their co-determination rights. 
Kozarzewski (2006) points out several important regulations concerning the topic of 
minority shareholders. 
Shareholders have the right to obtain sufficient information from the management to 
form a view on issues that are on the agenda of the next shareholder meeting. A 
shareholder who owns at least 10 percent of shares has the right to announce 
additional items to the agenda of the shareholder meeting and can call an extraordinary 
shareholder meeting on good reason. 
Minority shareholders have enhanced rights for group voting including preferential 
shares that grant their holders two votes per share, and golden shares that inter alia 
empower shareholders to appoint members of the supervisory board. 
Any shareholder or a group of shareholders that own at least five percent of voting 
rights can appoint an external controller to check company internal problems. 
Additionally, shareholders can raise an objection on decisions of the general meeting 
that are in conflict with the company charter or good corporate practices. 
Shareholders who hold at least 20 percent of all shares have the right to request the 
election of members of the supervisory board in cumulative voting and the possibility to 
delegate a representative of their group to the supervisory board. 
 
As recommended in the Polish Corporate Governance Code47 the terms of location, 
date, and time of the general meeting should allow access to information on topics of 
the agenda and a large presence of shareholders. The chairman of the general 
meeting should be impartial and independent from the company and from controlling 
blockholders. Additionally, the dominant shareholder should not hinder other 
shareholders in their exercise of information and voting rights. 
Furthermore, information on the company’s ownership and control structure, 
inequalities between ownership stakes and control stakes of shareholders, and voting 
agreements between several shareholders should be published by the company. 
7.2.3. The Management Board 
Polish public joint-stock companies are obliged to establish a two-tier board system 
consisting of the management board and the supervisory board. 
The management board is responsible for day-to-day business operations and has to 
fulfill managing tasks maintaining loyalty to the company, diligence, and transparency 
concerns. The management board is elected by the supervisory board or by 
                                                
47 See Corporate Governance Code for Polish Listed Companies, 2002 
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shareholders in the general meeting. It consists of at least one member elected for a 
period of five years with the possibility to extend this period by additional five years. 
Members of the management board are not allowed to hold seats on the supervisory 
board and vice-versa. The management board has to collaborate with the supervisory 
board and provide sufficient information on corporate operations. One single or all 
members of the management board can be discharged by the supervisory board in 
cases such as gross carelessness and misuse of control rights. 
 
Additional features concerning the function of the management board are addressed in 
the Polish Corporate Governance Code48: 
• General information about the members of the management board such as their 
professional skills, received remuneration, and positions held within other 
companies should be published. 
• Management remuneration should include base salary, bonuses, stock options and 
severance payments. Shares issued for stock option grants should not exceed 10 
percent of total shares over any five-year period. Additionally, the issue price of 
these shares should be close to the actual market price. 
• The general meeting should be joined by at least one member of the management 
board being able to answer concerns expressed by shareholders of the company. 
• Members of the management board should disclose conflicts of interest that arise 
in relation to corporate duties and responsibilities. 
7.2.4. The Supervisory Board 
The supervisory board is elected in the annual general meeting by shareholders 
through majority voting, group voting, or by other instructions within the company 
charter. It consists of at least three members who are appointed for a maximum period 
of five years. As stated above, members of the supervisory board are not allowed to 
hold seats on the management. Additionally, liquidators, accountants, legal advisors, 
and proxies of the company are excluded from the supervisory board.49 The 
supervisory board meets at least three times a year to discuss and check current 
operations and company activities. The supervisory board has the right to examine 
company protocols, reports, and accounting documents, and surely supervises and 
controls the actions of the management and the company. The effectiveness of the 
                                                
48 See Corporate Governance Code for Polish Listed Companies, 2002 
49 See Koladkiewicz, 2006 
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collaboration between the management board and the supervisory board depends on 
the available information on company issues provided by the management. The 
supervisory board can dismiss members of the management board upon good cause 
shown. There also exists the possibility to enlarge the rights of the supervisory board 
by additional specifications in the company charter. 
Koladkiewicz (2006) states that the scope of the actions of the supervisory board 
depends on the ownership structure, the ownership identity, and the size of the 
company. Since the supervisory board acts not only as controlling entity but also 
provides advice and services the importance of the supervisory board increases with 
the size and complexity of the corporation, and even enlarges in the case of 
subsidiaries. In the latter point the supervisory board functions as balancing entity 
between the interests of the parent company and those of the subsidiary. Moreover, 
there is no general requirement to include representatives of stakeholders in the 
supervisory board, but in practice many companies establish individual policies to 
represent employees in the supervisory board. 
 
Sure, the Corporate Governance Code for Listed Companies50 comments issues on 
Polish supervisory boards and partially overlaps with the recommendations of the 
WSE51 concerning this matter. Most important suggestions are: 
• The supervisory board should act in the interest of the company and especially in 
the interest of minority shareholders. 
• Members of the supervisory board should possess sufficient expertise, experience 
and time to perform the collection of relevant information, give advice, and execute 
monitoring actions. Basic information on these factors as well as the amount of their 
remuneration should be disclosed to the shareholders of the company. 
• The remuneration of the members of the supervisory board should be in relation to 
the size of the company’s business and to company performance. Additionally, 
compensation should be correspondent to the individual extent of tasks and 
responsibilities. 
• At least two members of the supervisory board should be independent which 
means the absence of any relationships to the company, to dominant shareholders, 
or to employees. The election and dismissal of these members should not be 
affected by controlling shareholders. 
                                                
50 See Corporate Governance Code for Polish Listed Companies, 2002 
51 See Code of Best Practice for WSE Listed Companies, 2007 
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• In the annual general meeting the supervisory board should present a status report 
on the current position and future prospects of the company, on risk management, 
internal corporate governance mechanisms, and on the work of the supervisory 
board itself. 
• A member of the supervisory board should announce any conflicts of interest 
concerning corporate operations. Furthermore, relationships between a member of 
the supervisory board and a shareholder possessing more than 5 percent of all 
votes should be disclosed. 
• Any agreements or transactions with a related entity of the company that are not 
among transactions of its typical operating business should require the approval of 
the supervisory board. 
• Finally, the supervisory board should establish an audit committee including 
company-involved members with sufficient qualifications in accounting and finance 
and at least one independent member. 
7.2.5. The Market for Corporate Control 
Takeovers can be important mechanisms to ensure competitive markets and the 
efficiency of companies. These control mechanisms of the market contribute to good 
external corporate governance and motivate both the management and the supervisory 
board to act in the interest of the company and its shareholders by maximizing the 
value of the corporation. Inefficiencies and differences in the company’s economic and 
market value increase the threat of a possible hostile takeover which leads to the 
replacement of the members of the management and supervisory board. However, 
companies tend to establish defense mechanisms against takeovers which are, on the 
one hand, necessary to maintain stability and to prevent inefficient opportunistic 
takeover but, on the other hand, limit the control potential of the market if used to 
excess. 
 
Polish public joint-stock companies can adopt several means to impede the success of 
a hostile takeover and to hinder a potential raider from acquiring the desired amount of 
shares and voting rights. 
Dual class shares issued by the company define two classes of shares, voting shares 
which give their holder the right (or multiple rights per share) to appoint or dismiss 
members of the supervisory board and to vote on other important corporate issues, and 
non-voting shares which exclude the exercise of voting rights and grant only dividend 
payments to their holder. Since such shares empower certain shareholders with 
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increased control rights they can be used as an anti-takeover defense against a hostile 
bid. Tamowicz and Dzierżanowski (2002) state that preferred shares which attach 
cumulative voting rights to one share are most common and that the maximum 
preference of five votes52 per share is utilized in 81 percent of cases. 
Another control device to defend a takeover is the establishment of a voting cap. The 
company charter can limit the voting rights of shareholders to at most 20 percent of 
total voting rights irrespective of the actual amount of voting rights possessed by these 
shareholders. Voting caps certainly do not apply for owners of preferred stock. 
However, this instrument is not very commonly used in Polish companies.53 
Companies can issue new shares of a total value up to 75 percent of existing share 
capital. According to this, authorized capital can be used as an anti-takeover device 
especially if these shares are issued without preferred voting rights. 
Additionally, companies can repurchase their own shares up to an amount of 10 
percent of total outstanding shares in order to prevent potential threats to the company. 
 
The Polish Corporate Governance Code54 discusses some of these anti-takeover 
defenses and recommends the following practices: 
• Companies should not use anti-takeover defenses against the interest of their 
shareholders. The use of such instruments should be approved by shareholders 
and be only applied over a limited period of time if these defenses are in the 
interest of both the company and the shareholders. 
• A shareholder who possesses more than 50 percent of voting rights should not be 
subject to restrictions of a voting cap. 
• Companies should not acquire their own shares in order to prevent a takeover. 
Furthermore, companies should only acquire their own shares through a public 
tender offer directed to all shareholders of the company. 
 
Generally, hostile takeovers were not very common in the past mainly due to the high 
ownership concentration in Polish companies. In this regard, Tamowicz and 
Dzierżanowski (2002) estimate that only 20 percent of public companies could be 
affected by the threat of a hostile takeover. Apart from high ownership concentration 
additional provisions may hamper an unforeseen hostile bid. These include the 
                                                
52 Meanwhile the maximum preference was lowered and at most two votes per share are 
allowed. However, this did not influence the popularity of preferred shares. 
53 See Tamowicz and Dzierżanowski (2002) 
54 See Corporate Governance Code for Polish Listed Companies, 2002 
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obligation to disclose each 2 percent increase in shareholdings if a shareholder owns 
more than 10 percent of voting rights, the restriction to acquire no more than 10 
percent of voting rights in a three-month period unless making a tender offer, and the 
requirement to obtain the approval of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority (PFSA) 
in order to increase shareholdings over 10, 20, 33, and 50 percent of voting rights or 
share capital. 
One of well-known examples of a hostile takeover in Poland, even though 
unsuccessful, was the attempt of Deutsche Bank to acquire the Polish bank BIG BG in 
2000. Deutsche Bank cumulated shares over a period of almost one year and tried to 
bypass mandatory bid requirements and the approval of the Polish Securities and 
Exchange Commission55 by several means. Finally, after a couple of further events, 
Deutsche Bank backed out of the attempt to acquire BIG BG. Main reasons for this 
pullback were political pressure and legal actions against the way Deutsche Bank had 
cumulated shares.56 
 
Recapitulatory, the Polish corporate governance environment possesses a broad and 
comprehensive field of regulations, especially concerning the Polish Corporate 
Governance Code and the Best Practices of the WSE. However, as mentioned at the 
beginning of this section there are also several drawbacks. The fact that many 
regulations are in general not mandatory and that companies have to only make a 
comply and explain statement to these rules leads to further considerations and open 
questions. To what extent do companies comply with these regulations? And why do 
companies diverge from particular principles and how meaningful are the stated 
reasons? Further issues concern the general picture of the implementation of corporate 
governance rules in Poland. How prevalent is the commitment to corporate governance 
concerns in Poland? And how are existing laws enforced? The following section deals 
with these questions and tries to provide some answers on particular matters. 
                                                
55 In 2006 the Polish Securities and Exchange Commission (PSEC) was replaced by the newly initiated 
Polish Financial Supervision Authority that took over the duties and responsibilities of the PSEC and acts 
as new monitoring body of the Polish capital market. 
56 See Tamowicz and Dzierżanowski (2002) 
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8. Disclosure of Corporate Governance 
Practices in Poland 
In general, the amount and quality of disclosure depends, on the one hand, on 
legislation and the additional regulatory framework and, on the other hand, on the 
actual implementation and enforcement of these rules in practice. Additionally, the 
extensiveness of disclosed information is influenced by company-specific factors and 
considerations. Berglöf and Pajuste (2005) argue that most of all minority shareholders 
benefit from higher disclosure that reduces the exploitation of private benefits by large 
blockholders. If the amount of possible benefit extraction by large shareholders is 
reduced these groups may diminish their monitoring activities of the company’s 
management which leads to a general trade-off between the emphasis on minority 
interests or on controlling shareholders. Moreover, disclosure is also related to direct 
financial costs and indirect costs. Direct financial costs include resources, effort, and 
money spent on producing the relevant information. Companies may reduce these 
costs in times of financial difficulties and companies in distress may hold back 
information in order to mask their economic and financial situation. Indirect costs of 
disclosure include the information given to competitors in the market which may lead to 
economic and competitive disadvantages for those companies which disclose more 
information. These trade-offs provide only some reasons why companies refrain from 
increasing not only voluntary but also mandatory disclosure standards. 
8.1. Disclosure and General Company-Specific Issues 
Besides theoretical models of disclosure, whereon this section does not focus, the 
relationship between disclosure and company-specific issues can be analyzed by 
empirical studies. 
 
Berglöf and Pajuste (2005) test several hypotheses concerning the financial 
performance and the ownership structure of companies in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Their first hypothesis assumes that companies which depend more on external capital 
disclose more. But this assumption is not supported by collected data which indicate 
that high external capital dependence does not encourage companies to increase the 
amount of disclosure. However, larger companies tend to provide higher voluntary 
disclosure and companies with better performance show a slightly higher amount of 
disclosed information. Another hypothesis suggests that companies in distress and 
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those with limited resource availability reduce disclosure to save costs or to retain 
crucial information from shareholders and the market. Therefore, financially less 
constrained firms should disclose more. Evidence strongly supports this hypothesis 
and shows that companies with higher cash balances and lower leverage have a 
higher amount of disclosure. Additionally, slower growing companies which have higher 
resource availability disclose more. The last hypothesis of Berglöf and Pajuste 
assumes that companies with concentrated ownership disclose less relevant 
information. Companies which are controlled by large shareholders are less dependent 
on transparency and may provide less protection of minority shareholders. Evidence 
confirms this relation especially in the case of highly concentrated ownership and a few 
numbers of external shareholders. On the one hand, these shareholders are directly 
and sufficiently informed through company internal information channels which 
decreases the need to provide extensive information by public means. And on the other 
hand, controlling shareholders tend to lower the amount of disclosed information to 
secure the receipt of private benefits. 
Further analyzes done by Kowalewski et al. (2007) on companies in Central and 
Eastern Europe find a positive impact of corporate governance practices and 
disclosure on dividend payouts. Companies with a better protection of shareholder 
rights generally pay out higher dividends than companies with weaker shareholder 
rights. This effect even increases in the case of poor investment opportunities since 
shareholders use their power to extract dividends rather than leaving corporate gains in 
the company. 
 
After this general view of the relationship between disclosure and general company-
specific issues the following section provides a precise discussion of the available 
information on specific corporate governance practices. 
8.2. Disclosure of Specific Governance Practices 
Berglöf and Pajuste (2005) analyze the actual disclosure and the information 
availability on both company websites and annual reports of companies located in 
Central and Eastern Europe. They evaluate a Web-Disclosure Index which measures 
the voluntary disclosure of most important corporate governance issues provided on 
the websites of listed companies and an AR-Disclosure Index which determines the 
amount of disclosure in companies’ annual reports. 
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In order to calculate the Web-Disclosure Index Berglöf and Pajuste examine several 
company-internal factors or sub-indices which are coded with 0, 0.5, or 1 according to 
the quality and amount of available information. These sub-indices rate the following 
issues: 
• the existence of a company website and whether the website is available only in 
the local language or additionally in English, 
• the disclosure of the latest annual report and whether it is available only in the local 
language or additionally in English, 
• the existence of a separate corporate governance section, 
• the availability of the names of managers, 
• the availability of the names of supervisory board members, 
• the availability of ownership structure, 
• and the disclosure of bylaws. 
 
Table 3 provides the average values of these singular sub-indices and shows the 
aggregate Web-Disclosure Index of companies in Central and Eastern European 
countries. In principle, the total Web-Disclosure Index ranges between 0 and 7 and a 
higher score implies a larger amount and better quality of available information on the 
companies’ websites. Voluntary disclosure largely varies among analyzed factors and 
countries and generally shows the need for further improvements since the average 
value of the Web-Disclosure Index only reaches a score of 2.26 concerning all Central 
and Eastern European countries, and a score of 2.51 with respect to Poland. 
Table 3: Website Disclosure by Country 









Bulgaria 0.36 0.17 0.17 0.42 0.25 0.25 0.08 0.86 32 
Czech Republic 0.91 0.63 0.03 0.74 0.68 0.65 0.00 3.53 32 
Estonia 0.77 0.50 0.00 0.40 0.10 0.50 0.10 2.23 11 
Hungary 0.75 0.57 0.29 0.72 0.61 0.50 0.29 2.71 26 
Latvia 0.91 0.40 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.00 1.82 11 
Lithuania 0.89 0.21 0.03 0.33 0.06 0.06 0.00 1.53 36 
Poland 0.80 0.30 0.07 0.66 0.54 0.41 0.20 2.51 153 
Romania 0.73 0.08 0.03 0.35 0.06 0.34 0.03 1.37 43 
Slovak Republic 0.80 0.75 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 3.40 5 
Slovenia 0.93 0.69 0.06 0.70 0.47 0.61 0.00 3.05 21 
Total 0.78 0.36 0.07 0.58 0.42 0.40 0.11 2.26 370 
Source: Berglöf and Pajuste (2005), Website Disclosure by Country 
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In Poland many company websites (0.80) are available in English and also the majority 
of Central and Eastern European companies provide an English version of their 
website. Solely Bulgaria is the rear light within this category with a Website Index of 
only 0.36. The names of managers (0.66) and board members (0.54) and the 
ownership structure (0.41) are disclosed in approximately half of the analyzed Polish 
companies. Unfortunately, many companies in Poland publish their annual report (0.30) 
only in the local language which crucially limits the information available to foreign 
shareholders and only a limited number of companies provide information on bylaws 
(0.20) on their website. Furthermore, only a minority of Polish companies offers a 
separate corporate governance section on their website which is reflected in the 
alarmingly low score of 0.07. This shows most of all the little awareness of the 
importance of corporate governance disclosure, the lack of commitment, and the need 
for improvements in this area. 
 
In order to analyze disclosure patterns in the annual reports of companies in Central 
and Eastern Europe Berglöf and Pajuste additionally create the AR-Disclosure Index. 
This index again consists of several factors or sub-indices which are coded with 0, 0.5, 
or 1 according to the amount of disclosed information. The particular issues analyzed in 
the annual reports are as follows: 
• the information on shareholdings by managers and board members - whether  
disclosed individually, in total, or not 
• the information on the remuneration of managers and board members - whether 
disclosed individually, in total, or not 
• the description of related-party transactions by shareholders, controlling parties, 
and managers - whether disclosed in detail, limited, or not 
• the names and ownership stakes of shareholders that hold more than 10 percent - 
whether disclosed individually, in total, or not 
• the existence of a separate corporate governance section 
 
Table 4 shows the average values of these singular factors and sums them up to the 
total AR-Disclosure Index which principally ranges from 0 to 5. A higher value implies a 
larger amount of information disclosed in the annual reports. As already observed on 
the website disclosure the levels of disclosure in annual reports largely vary among 
sub-indices and countries as well. The average value of AR-Disclosure reaches a 
score of 2.08 concerning all analyzed countries and only scores 1.62 with respect to 
Poland which implies an overall little amount of actual disclosure. 
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Table 4: Actual Annual Report Disclosure by Country 







Bulgaria 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 1.50 2 
Czech Republic 0.35 0.44 0.75 0.94 0.33 2.81 24 
Estonia 0.64 0.55 0.82 0.86 0.00 2.86 11 
Hungary 0.33 0.13 0.25 0.67 0.25 1.63 12 
Latvia 0.17 0.22 0.44 0.61 0.00 1.44 9 
Lithuania 0.73 0.42 0.19 0.98 0.00 2.31 24 
Poland 0.28 0.17 0.29 0.81 0.07 1.62 29 
Romania 0.25 0.00 0.13 1.00 0.00 1.83 4 
Slovak Republic 0.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.50 2 
Slovenia 0.55 0.36 0.09 0.86 0.00 1.86 11 
Total 0.42 0.30 0.39 0.86 0.11 2.08 128 
Source: Berglöf and Pajuste (2005), Annual Report Disclosure by Country (actual) 
Analyzing the scores of the individual factors of the AR-Disclosure Index, Table 4 
shows that the disclosure of information on direct ownership (0.81) is well conducted in 
the annual reports of Polish companies. Information on related-party transactions, 
managerial and board shareholdings, and management and board compensation is 
relatively low with scores of 0.29, 0.28, and 0.17. Unfortunately, information on the 
latter two issues is in most cases only provided in total and not itemized individually by 
each management or board member. Moreover, most Polish companies do not provide 
a separate corporate governance section in their annual report which can be seen on 
the alarmingly low score of 0.07.  
 
In order to relate these findings of actual disclosure with the by law required disclosure 
Berglöf and Pajuste evaluate the mandatory disclosure requirements of those analyzed 
factors by each country which are depicted in Table 5. Additionally, the variable AR-
Disclosure Difference is constructed as the actual minus the required disclosure and 
shows the country-specific divergence from mandatory regulations.  
In Poland, regulations concerning the amount of disclosure in annual reports include 
the declaration of aggregate shareholdings by managers and members of the 
supervisory board (0.50), a limited description of related-party transactions (0.50), and 
the full disclosure of all names and ownership stakes over the threshold of 10 percent 
(1.00). There is no requirement to disclose the compensation of managers and board 
members (0.00) and companies do not have to include a separate corporate 
governance section in their annual report (0.00). 
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Table 5: Mandatory Annual Report Disclosure by Country 









Bulgaria 1.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 2.50 – 1.00 
Czech Republic 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.00 2.50  0.31 
Estonia 1.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 2.50  0.36 
Hungary 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.50  0.13 
Latvia 0.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.50 – 0.06 
Lithuania 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.00 3.00 – 0.69 
Poland 0.50 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 2.00 – 0.38 
Romania 0.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.50 – 0.13 
Slovak Republic 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00  0.50 
Slovenia 0.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.00 2.00 – 0.14 
Total 0.50 0.28 0.45 1.00 0.00 2.22 – 0.14 
Source: Berglöf and Pajuste (2005), Annual Report Disclosure by Country (required by law) 
Comparing Table 4 to Table 5 shows that, on the one hand, Polish companies disclose 
less information on inside-shareholdings, related-party transactions, and on their 
ownership structure than required by law and that, on the other hand, some annual 
reports contain information on the remuneration of the management and supervisory 
board and a corporate governance section which are not part of mandatory regulations. 
Furthermore, the total difference between the actual and mandatory disclosure of 
Polish companies is relatively high (-0.38) compared to the average of Central and 
Eastern European countries and only Bulgaria (-1.00) and Lithuania (-0.69) face a 
higher divergence from required disclosure than Poland. 
Especially this final comparison points up the need for more stringent enforcement of 
existing regulations and supports the findings of Pistor et al. (2000) who argue that the 
enforcement of rights is relatively low in Central and Eastern European countries and 
that the real effectiveness of legal institutions depends more on the actual enforcement 
of regulations than on the law on the books. 
 
A more recent study on Polish listed companies is made by Kowalewski et al. (2007) 
who examine the quality of corporate governance on a sample of 110 non-financial 
companies. Therefore, Kowalewski et al. create the Transparency Disclosure Index 
(TDI) which measures the actual implementation of corporate governance principles in 
Polish listed companies. The relevant information is captured from companies’ annual 
reports, companies’ websites, filings with domestic regulatory agencies, and business 
publications in 2005. The TDI includes three sub-indices which are shown in Table 6. 
The Board Index analyzes the structure, internal procedures, and the compensation of 
the management and supervisory board. The Disclosure Index focuses on the available 
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information of corporate-specific issues to shareholders. And finally, the Shareholder 
Index considers the quality of information on the compensation of minority 
shareholders and on dividend policy. 
Table 6: The Transparency and Disclosure Index (TDI) 
Item % of companies with public information on each item 
TDI-Board  
Independency criteria for directors 22.08 
Years in office of present directors 23.38 
Code of Conduct for directors 74.68 
Manager and director fees 70.78 
Form of manager and director fee payment (cash, stock, stock options) 51.30 
Rationale of manager and director fees 34.42 
Information on whether manager and director fees are performance-based 38.96 
Shareholdings of managers and directors 74.03 
Number and percentage of independent directors 24.68 
Details on the nomination process of new directors 1.30 
Report on issues by dissident directors 0.00 
Composition of the different board committees 6.49 
Details on activities of the different board committees 1.30 
  
TDI-Disclosure  
Biography of main company officers 34.42 
Biography of directors 27.92 
Calendar of future events 41.56 
English-translated corporate website 85.71 
Financial indicators for the last 5 years 81.82 
Strategic plan and projections for the following years 29.87 
Publication of board meeting resolutions 94.16 
Publication of shareholders meeting resolutions 94.81 
Details on the appointment process of new directors 0.65 
Details on attendance of minority and controlling shareholders 
in shareholders' meetings 1.30 
Reports on issues raised by dissident shareholders 0.00 
Year of hiring of the external auditor 97.40 
Report of the external auditor 97.40 
  
TDI-Shareholders  
Details of corporate ownership (principal shareholders) 94.81 
Type and amount of outstanding shares 89.61 
Document on internal corporate governance standards 1.30 
Dividend policy in the past 5 years 18.83 
Projected dividend policy for the following years 7.14 
Rationale of the past and/or future dividend policy 11.04 
Source: Kowalewski et al. (2007), Structure of the Transparency and Disclosure Index (TDI) 
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Table 6 summarizes the results of the analyzed companies and partly supports but also 
partly vitiates the findings of Berglöf and Pajuste (2005). These variances can be 
explained by the different sources of information since Berglöf and Pajuste separately 
analyzed companies’ websites and annual reports and Kowalewski et al. examined the 
overall disclosure of websites, annual reports, and filings with domestic regulatory 
agencies. According to Kowalewski et al. a many Polish companies provide an English 
version of their website (85.71%) and disclose resolutions of board (94.16%) and 
shareholder meetings (94.81%). 94.81 percent of companies disclose details of their 
ownership structure and 89.61 percent give information on the type and amount of 
outstanding shares. The majority of Polish companies publish details of the 
remuneration (70.78%) and shareholdings (74.03%) by managers and board members 
and also the report of the external auditor is disclosed in most cases (97.40%). 
Unfortunately, issues on independent board members such as specific independency 
criteria (22.08%) and the numbers and percentage of independent board members 
(24.68%) are only presented by a few numbers of companies. Likewise, details of the 
composition of board committees (6.49%) and of the activities of these different 
committees (1.30) are only disclosed in a marginal number of companies. Moreover, 
there is a lack of information on the attendance of minority and controlling shareholders 
in general meetings (1.30%) and on issues raised by not agreeing shareholders which 
are disclosed not at all. 
 
Furthermore, Kowalewski et al. present descriptive statistics of above measures which 
are displayed in Table 7. The total TDI of 0.406 indicates a relatively low average of 
corporate governance standards in Polish companies with a minimum value of 0.094 
and a maximum value of 0.781 which implies a relatively high variation of these 
standards. This variation can be also seen in the Board, Disclosure, and Shareholder 
sub-indices which all show a minimum value of 0.00 and maximum values of 0.769, 
0.846, and 0.833. 
Table 7: Statistics of the Transparency and Disclosure Index (TDI) 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
TDI-Board 110 0.322 0.189 0.000 0.769 
TDI-Disclosure 110 0.513 0.152 0.000 0.846 
TDI-Shareholder 110 0.355 0.159 0.000 0.833 
Total TDI 110 0.406 0.134 0.094 0.781 
Source: Kowalewski et al. (2007), Descriptive Statistics 
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The mean of the Disclosure Index scores 0.513 and implies medium corporate 
governance standards concerning the available information to shareholders. However, 
the means of both the Board and the Shareholder Index are relatively low, reaching 
values of only 0.322 and 0.355, which again shows the need for higher commitment 
and enforcement of related corporate governance standards.  
8.3. Enforcement of Existing Regulations 
Even though the studies of Berglöf and Pajuste (2005) and Kowalewski et al. (2007) 
differ in a few particular findings both analyses implicate improvable standards of 
corporate governance and the high importance of the enforcement of existing 
regulations. 
 
Berglöf and Pajuste (2005) claim that many companies in Central and Eastern Europe 
are more concerned about the financial costs of disclosure than about the possibility to 
attract outside shareholders by a higher amount and better availability of information. 
Companies should increase disclosure of corporate operations, ownership structure, 
related-party transactions, and shareholdings by members of the management and 
supervisory board in order to foster transparency. Furthermore, the possibilities of legal 
recourse of minority shareholders and private law enforcement should be encouraged. 
Public enforcement should be additionally improved since a higher degree of public 
enforcement reduces the costs of private enforcement. 
Berglöf and Pajuste argue that private ordering and self-regulation are dominant 
patterns especially in the financial sector including investment banks which establish 
standards for underwriting, clearing houses which organize settlement and payment 
services, and other financial institutions which exchange information and develop rules 
for conflict. Private ordering is a main enforcement mechanism in Central and Eastern 
European markets and therefore private parties should be encouraged to adopt 
additional regulations. 
Kochanowicz et al. (2004) and Tamowicz (2006) confirm that institutional investors 
such as pension funds and investment funds are important instruments that undertake 
monitoring and screening activities on corporate performance and therefore contribute 
to the abidance of good corporate governance. Although, the Polish pension sector is 
quite young and funds only have marginal experience on governance activities some 
large funds contributed in corporate governance conflicts that led to the replacement of 
the management or supervisory board. Investment funds such as venture capital and 
private equity funds are more involved in corporate governance matters since most of 
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these funds are from abroad, fund managers possess sufficient experience, and aim to 
ensure efficient performance of their portfolio companies. During the last years, they 
contributed in the improvement of the position of the supervisory board and advised 
inter alia the appointment of independent board members and the auditor. 
Furthermore, investment funds developed their own corporate governance practices 
relevant to their portfolio companies. 
However, the efficiency of these mechanisms depends on the general regulatory 
environment since governmental support is an essential factor to guarantee a balanced 
corporate governance framework. Moreover, Durney and Kim (2003) state that 
individual companies or institutions cannot offset the lack of general governance 
policies by improving their own governance systems. Effective public enforcement 
depends on both the extensiveness of public law and the efficiency of enforcing 
institutions. Additionally, regulators and supervisors should generally be independent 
and have sufficient power and rights to fulfill their tasks. 
 
The strengths of Poland are the extensive regulatory framework and the 
comprehensive competence and power of the WSE and the Polish Financial 
Supervision Authority, while the weaknesses involve the low governmental commitment 
and the weak support of those institutions. Berglöf and Pajuste (2005) explain that 
direct and indirect investments in the enforcement of laws frequently exceed the 
benefits of expenditures and thus these costs reduce the governmental commitment to 
promote the rule of law even in the case of sufficient resources and reasonable returns 
from investments. Additionally, the WSE and the Polish Financial Supervision Authority 
face a trade-off between enforcing disclosure regulations and the threat of loosing 
companies that might leave the stock exchange for that reason. Therefore, the low 
degree of enforcement by authorities is also intended to a certain degree. 
Nevertheless, corporate governance and disclosure standards should be monitored 
more closely and regulators should increase sanctions for deviations of mandatory 
standards. Existing regulations should be stated and enforced unambiguously to foster 
consistent governance principles and to improve the general commitment to those 
standards. 
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9. Case Studies on Disclosure of Polish Listed 
Companies 
As already examined in the previous section, there is quite a large variance of 
disclosed information among listed companies ranging from absolutely no available 
information to extensive disclosure of corporate governance practices in Poland. In 
order to get an idea of how disclosure can be done and to show positive examples of 
corporate governance in Poland this analysis concentrates on companies that provide 
at least medium quantity and quality of corporate governance disclosure. Therefore this 
section analyzes the actual website presentation of four listed companies of the 
financial and the industry sector with respect to the amount of available information and 
the transparency of main corporate governance practices. These listed companies are 
Cash Flow S.A., a debt collection company, Bank BPH S.A., a domestic universal 
bank, Novita S.A., a textile producer, and Grupa Kęty S.A., a large company of the 
Polish aluminum industry. 
9.1. The Other Finance Sector – Cash Flow S.A. 
Cash Flow S.A.57 is one of 22 companies of the ‘other finance’ sector listed on the 
WSE. A short analysis of the ‘other finance’ sector shows that four companies do not 
even have a website, two websites are not available, and nine websites are only 
available in Polish. Seven companies of the ‘other finance’ sector provide additionally 
an English version of their website with partly only marginal information on corporate 
governance issues. 
 
Cash Flow engages in helping other businesses to regain financial stability by 
vindicating debtors, financing liabilities, factoring, or by other financial services. The 
target markets of Cash Flow consist of both individuals and businesses and cover the 
territory of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldavia, Georgia, Kyrgyz, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, 
and Turkmenistan. 
The company’s website presents a detailed description of singular business activities 
concerning debt collection, buying and financing liabilities, factoring, and mortgage 
management. Although the company is relatively small compared to other debt 
                                                
57 See Cash Flow S.A., http://www.cashflow.com.pl/ 
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collection companies on the Polish market it achieves one of the highest net incomes. 
69 percent of the company’s income is reached by debt collection while 16 percent 
comes from factoring and 15 percent from buying liabilities.  
Cash Flow was founded in 1997 and turned into a joint-stock company in 2000. In 2006 
the company made its debut on the WSE to gain capital for further development and 
other capital intensive operations. Cash Flow issued 2,500,500 C class shares in an 
open bid whereof 1,000,000 were offered to individual investors and 1,500,000 to 
corporate investors. The total amount of C class shares accounted for 33 percent of the 
total share capital (which is 7,500,000 Polish Złoty with a nominal value of 1 Polish 
Złoty of each share) and the initial public offer achieved a rate which was 21.25 percent 
higher than the stock issue price. 
 
As disclosed on the company’s website Cash Flow is controlled by two other 
companies, Garmint Limited which is owned by Cash Flow’s president Mr. Igor 
Kazimierski and Lune Capital Limited which is owned by Cash Flow’s vice president 
Mr. Grzegorz Gniady. In terms of the number of shares Garmit Limited holds 38 
percent and Lune Capital Limited 29 percent while 33 percent are owned by other 
shareholders. And in terms of votes in the general assembly Garmit Limited owns 48 
percent, Lune Capital Limited 36 percent, and other shareholders 16 percent of total 
votes. 
 
Apart from the above presented information on the president and the vice president of 
Cash Flow the website does not disclose any additional information on the members of 
the management board and unfortunately, there is no information on the supervisory 
board. Furthermore, the names of the two members of the management board are only 
mentioned in a subordinate clause within the section of the company’s shareholder 
structure. Therefore, Cash Flow should disclose at least the names of the members of 
the management and the supervisory board in a separate section on its website in 
order to provide sufficient information on these governing bodies. 
 
The website of Cash Flow provides a section on investor relations including sub-
sections on financial reports, the prospectus, the corporate calendar, corporate 
governance, and several financial forecasts. 
The sub-sections of financial reports and the prospectus show annual, semi-annual, 
and quarterly reports of the company and the prospectus of the initial public offering on 
the WSE. Unfortunately, these reports and the prospectus are only available in Polish 
which makes it difficult for foreign investors to gain information on these issues. The 
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financial calendar presents the publishing dates of financial reports and the forecasts 
show the approximated financial development of net turnover and net profits until 2009. 
In my opinion, the information on forecasts should be checkable by current financial 
reports which should be additionally presented in English in order to enlarge the picture 
of corporate operations from the shareholder’s perspective. 
The sub-section of corporate governance provides several documents including the 
statutes of Cash Flow, regulations of the general assembly, regulations of the 
management and supervisory board, and the compliance statement with the Best 
Practices of the WSE. These documents are also only available in Polish which indeed 
shows the will of the company to disclose information but is not helpful for foreign 
investors at the same time.  
 
Although the website of Cash Flow provides only medium information on corporate 
governance and important documents are only available in Polish this company site is 
one of the most informative sites compared to the websites of other companies of the 
‘other financial’ sector of the WSE. 
9.2. The Banking Sector – Bank BPH S.A. 
Among the banking sector there are 15 domestic banks listed on the WSE that all 
provide additionally an English version of their website. Generally, the disclosure and 
transparency of corporate governance practices on these websites is relatively high 
and can be seen as exemplary for other companies in different sectors. 
 
Bank BPH S.A.58 is a universal bank which serves individual customers, private 
companies, and other institutional clients. Bank BPH performs its services to 650,000 
customers in 200 subsidiaries in Poland and also operates on the international market. 
In the past, the bank was also involved in referendums and campaigns related to the 
EU accession of Poland and currently Bank BPH supports companies by raising funds 
from the EU. 
Bank BPH was established after the merger of Bank Przemysłowo-Handlowy Spółka 
Akcyjna (BPH) and Powszechny Bank Kredytowy Spółka Akcyjna (PBK) in 2001. The 
roots of BPH and PBK go back to 1989 where these two banks were spun off from the 
National Bank of Poland. In 1991 these companies were transformed into joint-stock 
companies that were wholly owned by the Polish State Treasury. BPH and PBK made 
                                                
58 See Bank BPH S.A., http://www.bph.pl/ 
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their debut on the WSE in 1995 and 1997. After the merger of these two banks in 2001 
the new name of the merged bank was Bank Przemysłowo-Handlowy PBK S.A. which 
was renamed in 2004 to Bank BPH S.A. In 2005 Bank BPH entered the UniCredit 
Group which acquired 93.93 percent of shares. In 2007 the spin-off of Bank BPH took 
place and the larger portion of the bank's business was incorporated into Bank Pekao. 
This transaction was the result of some takeovers by the UniCredit Group and an 
agreement between UniCredit and the Polish State Treasury. Further details on the 
history of the bank and the spin-off are available on the website of the company and 
provide sufficient information for shareholders. 
 
The current ownership structure of Bank BPH is transparently disclosed on the bank’s 
website. The total number of outstanding shares and votes amounts to 28,716,230 
whereof 71.03 percent are owned by UniCredit Italiano S.p.A., 25.29 percent by other 
shareholders including the Bank of New York, and 3.69 percent by the State Treasury. 
 
The separate corporate governance section on the bank’s website covers information 
on its management and supervisory board, on the general shareholder meeting, on 
principles of corporate governance and communication policy, and on the shareholder 
structure as already depicted above. Additionally, other sub-sections of the website 
refer to these issues which facilitates the locating of desired information. 
 
The management board of Bank BPH consists of four members who are listed by their 
position and duties and additionally, short curriculum vitas of the board members are 
provided on the website. The members of the management board are: Józef Wancer 
who is the president of the board (finance, retail banking, human resources, strategy, 
communication, internal audit), Mirosław Boniecki who is the deputy president of the 
board (INM, treasury, corporate banking and commercial real estate), Kazimierz Łabno 
(IT, services, integration), and Carl Normann Voekt (risk management). 
The disclosed rules of the management board define principles of the operations of the 
management board including competencies of the president of the board, procedures 
of adopting resolutions, the relationship between the management and the supervisory 
board, and general issues of decision making. The members of the management board 
are obliged to participate in the general shareholder meeting, have to provide quarterly 
reports to the supervisory board, and have to disclose any conflict of interests related 
to their occupied function in the company. Despite these general business regulations 
there is no information on the remuneration of the members of the management board 
disclosed directly on the website. 
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The supervisory board of Bank BPH consists of 13 members. Information on both their 
position within the board and their curriculum vitas is disclosed on the bank’s website. 
Additionally disclosed documents include a report on the supervisory board, the 
connections of board members with shareholders, and information on the committees 
of the supervisory board. 
The rules of the supervisory board define the duties of its members such as monitoring 
and advising the management board and the general supervision of the bank. The 
members of the supervisory board are obliged to participate in the general shareholder 
meeting and to disclose any conflict of interests and any relationships with majority 
shareholders to the management and the supervisory board. The amount of 
remuneration of the members of the supervisory board is determined by the bank’s 
shareholders in the general meeting and should be appropriate to the tasks and efforts 
of each individual member. 
Within the supervisory board an audit, remuneration, credit, and investment committee 
has to be established whose individual regulations can be found on the bank’s website. 
The audit committee consists of at least two independent members of the supervisory 
board and of at least one person qualified and experienced in accounting and finance. 
The audit committee supervises the bank’s financial reporting, internal audit, and risk 
features and monitors the external auditor. The remuneration committee issues 
opinions on the approval of amendments to the contracts with members of the 
management board, on the remuneration of the bank’s managers, and on the general 
remuneration policy on Bank BPH. The credit committee examines credit operations 
which exceed a certain amount of capital and monitors internal portfolio regulations and 
credit policies related to risk management. Finally, the investment committee monitors 
capital expenditures and projects exceeding a determined value of capital. 
 
In the section on corporate governance the website of Bank BPH provides a short 
introduction of general governance issues and discloses the compliance statement with 
the Best Practices of the WSE. This statement refers to the out-dated principles of 
2005 and should be amended by the compliance statement with Best Practices of 2007 
which are in force since 1 January 2008. According to this statement the bank complies 
with all rules and comments nearly all principles concerning their actual implementation 
in Bank BPH’s business. Additionally, many of these principles are included in the 
bank’s individual bylaws of the management and supervisory board and in the 
regulations of the general shareholder meeting. 
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The sub-section of the general shareholder meeting provides Bank BPH’s bylaws of 
the general meeting and current information on announcements and resolutions 
adopted by general and extraordinary meetings. 
The principles of communication policy involve transparency, fairness, equal access of 
information, reliability, high quality of disclosed information, and coordination of 
communication. Information is provided as required by law in the form of 
announcements and periodic reports and is available to all investors independent of 
their controlling power. Bank BPH provides fair communication of events which affect 
the share price of the bank’s stock and aims for high substantive quality of information 
and communication to its shareholders. 
 
The section on financial reports provides comprehensive access to annual, semi-
annual, and quarterly reports as well as to financial presentations of current and past 
years. The latest annual report 2006 of Bank BPH discloses a detailed description of 
related-party transaction including transactions with group companies, with subsidiaries 
and affiliates, and with the management and supervisory board. The shareholdings of 
members of the management and supervisory board are listed individually by each 
single member. Additionally, the individual remuneration of all board members is 
disclosed in Bank BPH’s annual report 2006. All these statements exceed the 
mandatory minimum disclosure requirements in Poland since companies are only 
obliged to provide limited information on related-party transactions, aggregate 
information on management and supervisory board shareholdings, and no information 
on their remuneration policy. Moreover, Bank BPH’s latest annual report 2006 contains 
sufficient information on the bank’s current ownership structure and fulfils mandatory 
requirements which demand the disclosure of all ownership stakes above a threshold 
of 10 percent. 
The sub-section on corporate governance within the annual report 2006 shortly informs 
about basic issues of Bank BPH’s governance and refers to other sections within the 
report which provide further details on specific issues. In my opinion this corporate 
governance section should be more extensive but with respect to current regulations 
that do not oblige separate governance sections within annual reports this claim is 
negligible. The compliance statement with the Best Practices of the WSE, as already 
provided on the bank’s website, is additionally enclosed in the report. 
 
The section ‘announcements’ on the website discloses ongoing information on 
shareholder meetings and the supervisory and management board. Furthermore, the 
section ‘investor calendar’ presents a detailed list of current and past events 
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concerning Bank BPH’s publication of financial reports and company-specific events 
such as shareholder meetings and conferences. Additionally, the website offers a 
section on frequently asked questions which provides a short review on general 
information, listing, financial reporting, ratings, and analyst recommendations. 
 
Recapitulatory, Bank BPH offers a well structured website with extensive disclosure of 
nearly all corporate governance relevant issues. Solely information on the 
remuneration of the members of the management board should be directly disclosed 
on the website and the compliance statement with the Best Practices of the WSE 
should be updated. 
9.3. The Light Industry Sector – Novita S.A. 
Novita S.A.59 operates in the Polish light industry sector. The light industry sector 
contains 11 domestic companies listed on the WSE whereof indeed ten companies 
provide an English version of their website but only two of them disclose sufficient 
information on corporate governance. Five company websites publish absolutely no 
information on governance issues and three companies offer only marginal information 
such as the names of the members of the management or supervisory board. 
 
Novita is a small but leading national manufacturer of technical non-wovens for the 
footwear and geo-nonwovens industry and the largest producer of water-needled non-
wovens. Besides the supply of domestic markets Novita also acts as notable exporter 
with exports accounting for 65 percent of total company sales. Additionally, Novita 
produces tufting wall-to-wall carpets which are mainly sold to Eastern European 
markets. 
Novita was established in 1976 as state-owned company producing needled carpets 
and non-woven textiles for the Polish market. In 1990 the company was transformed 
into a State Treasury company, was privatized in 1993 and made its debut as thirty-
seventh company on the WSE in 1994. The capital acquired from the public market 
enabled the company to undertake investments in technologies and business activities 
which exceeded a total value of 100 million Polish Złoty. 
The company’s initial capital amounts to 5,000,000 Polish Złoty divided into 2,500,000 
shares with a nominal value of two Złotys each. With regard to the ownership structure 
Novita’s website presents a table of shareholders who directly or indirectly possess at 
                                                
59 See Novita S.A., http://www.novita.com.pl/ 
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least five percent of shares and votes in the general shareholder meeting. 
Unfortunately, the description of the items in this table is stated in Polish which makes 
it difficult for a foreign investor to exactly identify the categories of the stated numbers. 
According to my interpretation of the table, Novita is owned by the following 
shareholders: Janusz Piczak (27.99%), Lentex S. A. (24.27%), Opera TFI S.A. 
(12.35%), Krzysztof Moska (10.69%), OFE Pocztylion (9.6%), and several minority 
shareholders who are holding the remaining 15.1 percent. 
 
The management board of Novita consists of the president and general director Henryk 
Jerzy Kaczmarek and the vice president marketing and sales director Radosław 
Muzioł. The supervisory board is composed of five members whose positions within the 
board are only disclosed in Polish. There is no information available on the curriculum 
vitas of these members and more crucially, there is no information available on the 
relationships of the members of the supervisory board with shareholders of the 
company. 
 
The company statutes are disclosed on the website and include several regulations 
concerning the management and supervisory board and the general shareholder 
meeting. With respect to these statutes the management board should be composed of 
at least two members who are elected for three years and nominated by the 
supervisory board. The supervisory board should consist of at least three members 
who are elected in the general shareholder meeting for a period of three years. The 
supervisory board meets at least once per quarter and supervises financial and 
operating business activities. Furthermore, the remuneration of the supervisory board 
is set by the general assembly of shareholders. The section of the general shareholder 
meeting in the statutes includes issues on voting procedures and decision making 
processes such as resolutions on dividend payments, financial activities, and business 
operations. 
 
Additionally, the website presents a corporate governance section which only discloses 
the compliance statement with the Best Practices of the WSE of 2005. Novita complies 
with all except three of these principles and comments many of them according to their 
implementation in the company’s business. 
Novita does not comply with the recommendation that at least one half of the 
supervisory board members should be independent from the company, shareholders, 
and from employees. They explain that the composition of the supervisory board is set 
by shareholders in the general meeting and that the company publicly announces the 
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composition of the board and personal data of its individual members. In my opinion, 
this represents an insufficient explanation of the deviation from the independency 
criterion and shows that the company understates the importance of independent 
members of the supervisory board. Thus, the company also does not comply with the 
principle that at least one independent member of the supervisory board should agree 
to resolutions concerning related-party transactions and the choosing of an external 
auditor. Novita explains that all transactions between members of the management and 
supervisory board and the company are carefully screened and that the company 
informs publicly about them. Finally, Novita remarks that the above principles should be 
implemented no later than the end of 2004 which indeed was not reviewable from my 
perspective. 
 
At the first glimpse the section ‘shareholder’s info’ provides the financial reports of the 
last four years. Unfortunately, the selection of one specific report does not work 
correctly due to apparent programming errors of the website. Moreover, these reports 
would only be available in Polish which would require specific language skills of foreign 
interested parties. Thus, it was not possible to check the compliance with mandatory 
disclosure regulations in Novita’s annual reports. 
Besides the absence of available annual reports there are no announcements on 
business activities and current issues concerning the general shareholder meeting. 
According to this and to above mentioned shortcomings there is much room for 
improvement of the company’s website presentation. 
9.4. The Metal Sector – Grupa Kęty S.A. 
Grupa Kęty S.A.60 is one of 17 domestic companies of the metal sector listed on the 
WSE. A short analyzes of the companies’ websites reveals that one website is not 
available, one website is only available in Polish, and that 15 companies provide an 
English version of their website. Among those one company website discloses no 
information on corporate governance, eight companies provide only marginal 
information, and six companies disclose medium to good information on corporate 
governance practices. 
 
Grupa Kęty is one of the most modern and fastest-growing companies of the Polish 
aluminum industry and the corporate holding consists of 20 subsidiaries. The 
                                                
60 See Grupa Kęty S.A., http://www.gk-kety.com.pl/ 
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company’s business units involve extruded products, aluminum systems, and flexible 
packaging systems which are delivered to various branches such as construction and 
building, the automotive industry, food concentrates, sweets and confectionery, indoor 
fittings, and the aircraft industry. Grupa Kęty supplies countries inside and outside of 
Europe and ranks among the largest companies of the Polish metal sector. 
In 1992 the former state-owned company was transformed into a joint-stock company 
and in 1996 the company made its debut on the WSE. The basic capital of Grupa Kęty 
amounts to 23,064,157.50 Polish Złoty and currently 9,225,663 ordinary bearer 
shares61 of series A-D, each of par value 2.50 Polish Złoty, are traded on the WSE. 
 
As disclosed on the website the main shareholders by the number of shares and votes 
of Grupa Kęty are ING Nationale-Nederlanden Polska OFE (10.95%), Commercial 
Union OFE BPH CU WBK (9.998%), Pioneer Pekao Investment Management S.A. 
(5.88%), Julius Baer Investment Management LLC (5.88%), and Raiffeisen 
Zentralbank Österreich AG (5.74%). The remaining stake of 61.55 percent is owned by 
various minority shareholders. 
 
The members of the management board of Grupa Kęty are Dariusz Mańko who is the 
president and the Chief Executive Officer of the company and Adam Piela who is a 
regular member of the management board and the Chief Financial Officer. In addition 
to this information short curriculum vitas of both members are disclosed on the website. 
The supervisory board of the company consists of five members who are listed with 
their names, positions, and a short description of their curriculum vitas. The 
relationships of the members of the supervisory board to other companies are included 
in their curriculum vitas. This requires that investors exactly read these descriptions to 
gain information on the involvement of board members in other companies. Information 
on the remuneration of the management and supervisory board is not directly disclosed 
on the website. Though, a table within another section of the website inter alia shows 
that in 2003 and 2005 the management board of Grupa Kęty was compensated with 
500 and 300 shares with a nominal value of 2.50 Polish Złoty of each share. 
 
The section ‘company records’ discloses regulations of the company statutes, the 
general shareholder meeting, the management board, and the audit and remuneration 
                                                
61 Bearer shares are different from normal shares as no records are kept of the owners. Whoever 
physically holds the papers of the bearer shares owns the stock. The advantage of bearer shares is the 
anonymity of its holders but the disadvantage is the extremely difficult recovery in the case of loss of the 
papers. 
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committee. Links to these documents are also provided within the corporate 
governance section of the company’s website. 
With regard to the company statutes the management board should consist of one to 
five members who are appointed by the supervisory board for a period of three years. 
The supervisory board should be composed of five to six members who are elected by 
shareholders in the general meeting for a period of three years. At least half of the 
members of the supervisory board should be independent from any connections which 
influence substantial decisions of the members of the board. These connections 
include relationships with the company, with shareholders, and with employees of 
Grupa Kęty. The remuneration of the members of the supervisory board is set by a 
resolution of the general shareholder meeting. Additionally, the company statutes 
include regulations concerning the duties of the management and supervisory board, 
general decision-making procedures, and monitoring activities of the supervisory 
board. 
The bylaws of the management board provide further regulations on the rights and 
duties of the board members, decision-making processes, and business operations. 
The bylaws of the general shareholder meeting regulate ordinary and extraordinary 
shareholder meetings and the adoption of general resolutions. 
The rules of both the audit and the remuneration committee include extensive 
regulations on their tasks and spheres of action. According to the rules of the audit 
committee the committee should be composed of at least two members who are 
appointed by the supervisory board. Requirements concerning their independence 
should be fulfilled according to the principles of the WSE. The audit committee 
monitors the financial statements of the company, establishes proper systems of 
internal accounting and audition, controls the independence of the external auditor, and 
provides a committee report which is submitted to the general shareholder meeting. 
The remuneration committee controls and supervises the remuneration of the members 
of the management board, analyzes the system of remuneration compared to other 
systems of remuneration on the market, and publishes a report on its operations to the 
supervisory board and to the general shareholder meeting. The committee should be 
composed of at least two members who are appointed by the supervisory board. 
 
The section on investor relations includes inter alia basic company information, a 
corporate governance section, the corporate calendar, stock exchange 
announcements, financial accounts, and the prospectus of the company. Furthermore, 
the names and contact information of analysts of Grupa Kęty are disclosed and 
presentations on financial results and forecasts are available within this section. 
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The corporate governance section of the website discloses the compliance statement 
with the Best Practices of the WSE. Unfortunately, this statement refers to the 
principles of 2005 and should be amended by a new statement referring to the Best 
Practices of 2007 which came into force on the 1 January 2008. According to the 
provided statement Grupa Kęty complies with all principles but does not state any 
comments on the compliance. This is not mandatory but would provide a larger insight 
on the actual implementation of these principles in the company’s governance 
mechanisms. Additionally, within this corporate governance section a statement on risk 
management is provided which includes issues of interest rate risk, the risk of 
extraordinary events, forex risk, price risk, and of mercantile credit risk. 
The corporate calendar shortly lists important financial events of the last year. 
Moreover, announcements of transactions on the stock exchange are disclosed 
providing a brief description of various transactions. The stock exchange prospectus of 
Grupa Kęty is available for download and accommodates investors with key 
information on the company. 
 
The section on financial accounts presents the annual, semi-annual, and quarterly 
financial reports of the last three years which are available in English. Additionally, it 
shows a good overview on basic balance sheet items such as revenues, profits, and 
liabilities from 2000 to 2006. This overview provides a quick access to basic financial 
data of Grupa Kęty without the need for reading financial reports. The latest annual 
report 2006 discloses a detailed list of the ownership structure of the company which 
indeed partly differs from the current ownership structure presented on the website but 
is explainable by changes in shareholdings in 2007. 
Transactions with subsidiaries and other transactions including members of the board 
of directors are only described briefly in one sentence. With respect to the former 
transactions Grupa Kęty states that all transactions between associated companies are 
conducted at market prices and apply to the current operating activity. The latter 
transactions with board members are answered in the negative apart from share based 
payments. This declaration of related-party transactions corresponds to mandatory 
regulations but it would be preferable to find out more about these transactions.  
The remuneration of members of the management and supervisory board is disclosed 
by the aggregate amount of received payments which is indeed not required by law but 
would be more informative if listed individually. Shareholdings by managers and 
members of the supervisory board are provided in an aggregate number according to 
requirements by law. A sub-section on employee benefits offers sufficient information 
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on share remunerations and describes current employee share programs, retirement 
benefits and other benefits granted by Grupa Kęty.  
Unfortunately, there is no separate section on corporate governance within the annual 
report 2006 and solely brief declarations at the beginning of the report state that the 
company complies with all governance principles of 2005. Furthermore, Grupa Kęty 
sees corporate governance as important and indispensible factor within the company 
and was rewarded with the ‘Bull and Bear Award of Gazeta Giełdy Parkiet’ for highest 
corporate governance standards in 2006. 
 
Remarkably, the website of Grupa Kęty is available in Polish, Russian, English, and 
German and provides useful links to several Polish institutions such as the WSE, the 
Polish Financial Supervisory Authority, the National Depository for Securities, and the 
Association of Stock Exchange Issuers. 
 
Recapitulatory, Grupa Kęty fulfils all mandatory regulations of disclosure and provides 
comprehensive information on corporate governance practices within the company. 
Some improvements could be achieved by disclosing individual remuneration of the 
members of the management and supervisory board and by providing a more 
extensive description of related-party transactions of the company itself and the 
members of its supervisory board. 
9.5. Summary of Case Study Results 
The analysis of the actual corporate governance presentation of companies’ websites 
and their annual reports showed considerable differences in the quantity and quality of 
disclosure. The debt collection company Cash Flow offers medium information on 
corporate governance issues and could improve transparency by explicitly disclosing 
the names of the members of the management and supervisory board and by providing 
important documents such as annual reports and governance statements in English. 
Despite these claims Cash Flow is one of the most transparent companies of the ‘other 
finance’ sector which shows the low average of disclosure standards within this 
business sector. 
Likewise the textile producer Novita discloses medium information on corporate 
governance. Crucially, there is no transparency of relationships of the board members 
with shareholders or other businesses and the company does not comply with the 
independency criteria of members of the supervisory board. Additionally, annual 
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reports are only available in Polish and unfortunately the download of these documents 
does not operate correctly. 
Grupa Kęty, a large player in the Polish aluminum industry, provides comprehensive 
transparency of governance issues on its website and fulfils all mandatory regulations 
concerning disclosure in annual reports. Improvements could be achieved by disclosing 
individual remuneration and shareholdings of the members of the management and 
supervisory board and by providing a more extensive description of related-party 
transactions. Apart from these claims Grupa Kęty is among the upper ranks of the 
companies of the metal sector since several companies of this sector only provide 
marginal transparency. 
Finally, the Polish universal bank Bank BPH offers a well structured website and 
extensive disclosure of relevant corporate governance practices. Furthermore, the 
bank discloses more than the mandatory information on ownership structure, related-
party transactions, inside-shareholdings, and remuneration policies in its annual reports 
and can be described as role model for other companies in different sectors. 
Recapitulatory, there is room for improvements, not only concerning analyzed 
companies but also regarding other companies within examined business sectors. The 
general commitment to corporate governance and especially the enforcement of 
mandatory regulations should be pressed ahead in order to establish a framework of 
sound governance standards. 
 79
10. Conclusion 
Poland is one of those Central and Eastern European Countries which successfully 
managed to leave the planned economy of the former socialistic regime behind and 
effectively developed a market-oriented economic system. Through its transition 
process of the 1990s political, social, and economic reforms were undertaken to 
revolutionize and redefine prevalent structures and modes of business operations. 
Small state-owned companies were rapidly privatized while medium-sized and large 
national companies were commercialized by several intermediate steps including the 
NIF program. The banking sector was restructured and the capital market was 
recreated by the reactivation of the WSE. Additionally, in the course of the Balcerowicz 
Plan and the overall shock therapy in the country various macroeconomic reforms were 
undertaken. Drawing a balance of the years under restructuring Poland was a pioneer 
among other Eastern European transition countries and the new market orientation not 
only involved economic benefits but also contributed to a manifold accessibility of 
goods and services and a higher standard of living. After years of reform processes 
Poland terminated its main transition process and joined the European Union on 1 May 
2004. Nevertheless, the high unemployment rate, undercapitalization of small and 
medium-sized corporations, the underdeveloped transportation infrastructure, and last 
but not least corruption are still main concerns in Poland. 
 
In order to establish corporate governance mechanisms in Poland an extensive legal 
framework was created and regulations on governance practices were modeled on 
international standards and with the aid of foreign experts and organizations. The 
Polish Corporate Governance Code and the Code of Best Practice for WSE Listed 
Companies provide recommendations on the topic of sound corporate governance. 
Governing corporate bodies such as the management and supervisory board are tied 
to several regulations that determine their duties and responsibilities in connection with 
company operations and shareholders. Since concentrated ownership is prevalent in 
Poland and the market for corporate control is of little importance, the protection of 
minority shareholders is especially considerable. Of major concerns are the 
commitment to existing governance standards and the enforcement of regulations 
which have to be effectively promoted. Unfortunately, the lack of enforcement and the 
little sanction of non-compliance with laws undermine the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the in other respects sound regulatory framework. 
Besides governmental enforcement private ordering and self-regulation are important 
factors in the establishment of general standards. Private parties such as investment 
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banks, clearing houses, and pension and investment funds contribute to good 
corporate governance by enforcing their own regulations, supporting monitoring 
activities, and by improving transparency of corporate operations. However, the 
prominence of these financial institutions is expandable and should be fostered. 
Unfortunately, the WSE and the Polish Financial Supervision Authority face a trade-off 
between enforcing regulations and the threat of loosing companies that might leave the 
stock exchange for that reason and therefore reduce the pressure on companies that 
are not keeping all existing conditions of good practices. 
 
Especially with respect to corporate disclosure and transparency, there are large 
variances among business sectors and particular companies in Poland. Available 
information on governance practices in companies ranges from absolutely no 
disclosure to extensive declarations of internal standards and governance 
mechanisms. This diploma thesis examined the website disclosure and the compliance 
with mandatory disclosure requirements in annual reports of four listed companies in 
order to show positive examples of corporate governance and to get an idea of how 
good disclosure can be done. The compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements 
was checked up on annual reports with regard to shareholdings by the management 
and supervisory board, related-party transactions, ownership structures, board 
remuneration, and corporate governance sections within the reports. Additionally, the 
voluntary disclosure on company websites was analyzed according to the quantity and 
quality of provided information. 
Generally, the disclosure of companies within the banking sector can be seen as 
exemplarily and not only encompasses but also often exceeds mandatory 
requirements. Within the metal and light industry sector there is more variance of 
disclosure and especially, important corporate and financial documents are often not 
available in English. Furthermore, several companies of these sectors only provide 
marginal information of governance issues on their websites. Finally, the ‘other finance’ 
sector brings up the rear among analyzed business sectors. The main reason for this 
bad ranking is that a couple of companies do not even offer a corporate website. 
Furthermore, those companies which have a website generally provide only low 
quantity and quality of disclosed information. 
 
Recapitulatory, there is an ample field for improvements and both the general 
commitment to corporate governance and the enforcement of mandatory regulations 
should be fostered in order to improve actual governance and disclosure standards in 
Poland. 
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The necessity of good corporate governance is not a new issue and has gained even 
more importance in consequence of major economic scandals, corporate collapses, 
and management failures in recent years. Additionally, reliability, accountability, and 
transparency of a company and its management are relevant factors when searching 
for external sources of finance. Good corporate governance structures must take 
corporate and economic-specific circumstances into account such as the degree of the 
separation of ownership and control, the ownership identity, internal and external 
monitoring mechanisms, the market for corporate control, product market competition, 
and the legal corporate environment. Therefore, this diploma thesis first of all discusses 
the historical and theoretical background of the separation of ownership and control 
and clearly points out most important mechanisms of sound corporate governance. 
 
After this look at general corporate governance issues transition economies in Central 
and Eastern European countries are examined at the exemplification of Poland. During 
the 1990s Poland had to undergo several political, social, and economic reform 
processes in order to overcome the socialistic regime and to develop market 
economies of industrialized countries. Besides macroeconomic reforms, former state-
owned companies were privatized, the banking sector was restructured, and the Polish 
capital market was recreated by the reactivation of the Warsaw Stock Exchange. 
Additionally, corporate governance had to be revolutionized and new mechanisms had 
to be defined including fundamental changes in legislation and in corporate behavior. 
Specific focus of this diploma thesis lies on the creation and execution of corporate 
governance mechanisms in Poland, related strengths and weaknesses, and their 
effectiveness. In order to evaluate the general commitment and enforcement of 
governance regulations actual disclosure standards in Poland are analyzed. Therefore, 
the website presentation and the compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements 
in annual reports are examined in order to get a general idea of the real effectiveness 
and efficiency of corporate governance standards. Evidence and case studies suggest 
that transparency and disclosure largely various among Polish industry sectors and 
companies. There is an ample field for improvements of both the general awareness of 




Vor allem in den letzten Jahren nahmen Diskussionen rund um das Thema Corporate 
Governance zu und die Notwendigkeit guter Unternehmensführung wurde durch jüngst 
auftretende Wirtschaftsskandale und Unternehmenszusammenbrüche besonders 
verdeutlicht. Zusätzlich sind Glaubwürdigkeit, Verantwortlichkeit und Transparenz 
eines Unternehmens relevante Faktoren auf dem externen Kapitalmarkt. Corporate 
Governance Strukturen berücksichtigen unternehmens- und wirtschaftsspezifische 
Umstände wie beispielsweise den Grad der Trennung von Eigentum und Kontrolle, die 
Identität der Eigentümer, interne und externe Überwachungsmechanismen, den 
Kontroll- und Produktmarkt und das unternehmensrechtliche Umfeld. Um einen 
Überblick über diese Thematik zu verschaffen befasst sich diese Diplomarbeit 
anfänglich mit den Hintergründen der Trennung von Eigentum und Kontrolle und 
identifiziert die wichtigsten Faktoren und Mechanismen guter Corporate Governance. 
 
Nach dieser Einführung werden Übergangsländer in Zentral- und Osteuropa am 
Beispiel von Polen analysiert. Politische, gesellschaftliche und wirtschaftliche 
Reformen in den Neunzigern zielten darauf ab das System der Planwirtschaft in Polen 
durch ein System der Marktwirtschaft abzulösen. Neben speziellen makro-
ökonomischen Reformen galt es Staatsbetriebe zu privatisieren, den Bankensektor zu 
restrukturieren und den polnischen Kapitalmarkt durch die Wiederbelebung der 
Warschauer Börse wiederherzustellen. Ebenfalls musste das Verständnis von 
Corporate Governance neu definiert werden und adäquate Mechanismen geschaffen 
werden, die Änderungen in der Gesetzgebung und in der Führung und Kontrolle von 
Unternehmen beinhalteten. Im Speziellen befasst sich diese Diplomarbeit mit der 
Gestaltung und Kontrolle von Corporate Governance Mechanismen in Polen und 
untersucht diesbezügliche Stärken und Schwächen und deren Wirkungsweise. Um die 
Einhaltung von Corporate Governance Regulierungen näher zu betrachten werden 
außerdem die Quantität und Qualität der aktuellen Unternehmenspublizität in Polen 
analysiert. Besonderes Augenmerk liegt dabei auf der Veröffentlichung von relevanten 
Informationen auf Unternehmenswebseiten und auf der Einhaltung von 
Offenlegungspflichten in den Jahresberichten. Studien zeigen große Unterschiede in 
der Unternehmenspublizität sowohl zwischen verschiedenen Industriesektoren als 
auch zwischen einzelnen Unternehmen. Demnach sollte speziell das Bewusstsein der 
Wichtigkeit guter Corporate Governance gefördert werden aber auch die Kontrolle von 
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